Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

THE ALLEGED TARGET: THE NATANZ FUEL ENRICHMENT FACILITY225FIGURE 13.1 GoogleEarth image of Natanz’ Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant(PFEP). Image copyright 2012, Google.In late April 2007, IR-1 centrifuges at Natanz started enriching uranium. 72 It was not untilthe IAEA reported in February 2009 that six cascades of 164 centrifuges each were actuallyenriching uranium in one of the underground facilities (as opposed to working under vacuum,which precedes the actual enrichment process). 73In late 2009, Natanz reached what was so far its peak with 9000 installed IR-1 centrifuges. 74The number of gas centrifuges estimated to be actually enriching uranium at the Natanz FEPwas 5000 in spring 2009. Possibly an effect of Stuxnet, a this number diminished by about athousand within the following year, but in spring 2011, 6000 centrifuges were fed with uraniumhexafluoride (UF 6 ). 75The discovery of the Natanz site initiated an international dispute about its function.American officials fear that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons, while Iranian officialsstrongly reject this idea referring to future electricity needs in the country. In late summer2009, the construction of another fuel enrichment plant near the city of Quom was publicallyrevealed by three western powers causing further apprehension over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.The underground Fordow fuel enrichment plant is designed to house 3000 gas centrifuges.76 Over the following years, the uranium enrichment to contain 19.95% U-235 wasshifted to this facility. 77Uranium hexafluoride that is enriched to contain 20% U-235 offers multiple uses. In Iran,its sole civilian reason to exist is its use in the Tehran’s Research Reactor (TRR), although thea The virus is also thought to have introduced a greater inefficiency in the production of enriched uranium asthe product to feed ratio appeared to have suffered substantially.