Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

160 8. DUQU, FLAME, GAUSS, THE NEXT GENERATION OF CYBER EXPLOITATIONINTRODUCTIONThough interesting, the cyber-espionage operations of Chapter 7 really represent an initialforay into the use of intelligence-gathering cyber platforms. In the past 3 years, severaladvanced pieces of malware have emerged: namely, Stuxnet, Duqu, Flame, and Gauss. Manybelieve that these four pieces of software represent the future of cyber warfare. In this chapter,we describe the Duqu intelligence-collecting platform in detail along with some preliminaryinformation regarding Flame and Gauss—which also harvest information from the targetsystem and are believed by some to be related to Duqu. Stuxnet, which many researchersbelieve to be related to the other three, was designed to primarily target industrial controlsystems, and is described in detail in Chapter 13. Here we discuss Stuxnet in the contextof its technical similarities to the other pieces of software.Stuxnet was the first of these advanced pieces of software that was discovered. In 2011, ittook the world by surprise. Previously, the popular concept of a computer virus involved anunsophisticated piece of code that performed a few very basic steps to “infect” a computer,and then a few more steps to “propagate” to other computers. These viruses, such as the“Melissa” and “ILoveYou” viruses, were high-powered annoyances that caused indiscriminatemayhem. Stuxnet, as the media and open security community portrayed it, was not avirus but a complicated software system that was unique in its sophistication. 1 More thanthat, Stuxnet was a tool used by parties unknown to affect a direct change, allegedly to thenuclear program of Iran. 2Stuxnet was a system that needed very precise information to be effective. That malwareconcerned itself with the operation of high-precision motors used in industrial processes, andit made subtle modifications to the functional parameters of those motors. These modificationswould be made to systems that were not connected to the Internet (a circumstance oftenreferred to as “blind”); so, precise information was needed ahead of time. Additionally, futureStuxnet-type attacks would probably require similar information about their specific targetsto be effective. 3The Duqu Trojan was detected in October 2011 and was identified as an informationstealing Trojan. Some initial analysis revealed similarities between Duqu and Stuxnet, bothin tactics and in the structure of the malicious programs. Both Duqu and Stuxnet, as piecesof software, were charged with executing on a computer system and remaining resident onthe infected systems. Due to the similarities between the two pieces of malware and the factthat Stuxnet seems to have had a clear political motivation (curtailing the Iranian productionon enriched Uranium), it is conceivable that Duqu was designed to steal informationin preparation for a Stuxnet-like attack. Hence, we view Duqu as an intelligence-gathering/cyber-espionage tool—although more advanced than other such tools (i.e., those discussed inChapter 7). Further, it appears that advanced cyber-based intelligence-gathering campaignsare continuing. The more recent discoveries of related malware in the Middle East, specificallyGauss and Flame, indicate that malware such as Duqu is becoming the norm—displacing some of the more first-generation efforts discussed in Chapter 7.Programs like these have long-term goals with infected computers and need to concealtheir presence. Viruses such as “Melissa” and worms such as the “Slammer” worm didnot have the goal of remaining undetected. So, similar to the efforts directed against the