Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

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C H A P T E R4When Who Tells the Best Story Wins:Cyber and Information Operations inthe Middle EastO U T L I N EHijacking Noncombatant Civilian IPAddresses to Help the War Effort:The Israel-Hezbollah “July War”of 2006 34The Information Operations ofHezbollah 35Hezbollah Hijacks IP Addresses 37Civilians in the Cyber Melee: OperationCast Lead 38IO and Cyber Warfare in the 2008Israel-Hamas War 39Summary 41Suggested Further Reading 41INFORMATIONINTHISCHAPTER• Cyber operations during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war• The utility of cyber operations ininformation operations• IP address hijacking and CYOP• Cybercortical warfare33
34 4. CYBER AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EASTIn Chapters 2 and 3, the incidents of cyber attack were somewhat one-sided in the virtualworld. The Russians attacked Estonia and Georgia with little or no retaliation from the othercombatant. However, two other wars that occurred in the same decade saw significant cyberattacks performed by both sides, specifically, the Israel-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006(“July War”) and the Israel-Hamas war of 2008-2009 (“Operation Cast Lead”).Conventional wisdom on the cyber capabilities of the combatants in these conflicts couldlead us to believe that Israel likely is the more formidable cyber force. For instance, it has beenlong rumored that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) “Unit 8200” was involved in cyber operationsthroughout the early 2000s. 1 Anti-Israeli groups were generally less regarded in thisrespect. The “cyber terrorist” group known as “Team Evil” 2 —predominantly consisting ofMoroccan youths 3 —was noted for many hacks, particularly Web defacements, throughoutthe first decade of the 2000s. However, although numerous, these hacks generally lackedsophistication. The cyber activities of the “July War” and “Operation Cast Lead” moved somewhatbeyond these more simplistic attacks. As Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah and Hamas isexpected to continue for the foreseeable future, we can expect the cyber activities to continue toevolve, perhaps making the Levant one of the fastest developing areas of the world in the field.HIJACKING NONCOMBATANT CIVILIAN IPADDRESSES TO HELP THE WAR EFFORT: THEISRAEL-HEZBOLLAH “JULY WAR” OF 2006In February 2005, Lebanon was rocked with the assassination of Former Prime MinisterRafiq al-Hariri. This event resulted in mass Lebanese protests (“Cedar Revolution”) againstoccupational power Syria as well as American and French insistence on the withdrawal ofSyrian troops from the country. Syria ultimately obliged, leaving the Lebanese to form anew coalition government in April 2005. 4 Many in the West believed that this new governmentwould lead to the demilitarization of Hezbollah. The Iranian-supported Shi’ite militantgroup operates freely in Lebanon and is listed as a “terrorist group” by the United States. Withits role doubted by many in Lebanon, and rumors of an impending Israeli strike on Lebanon,the leaders of Hezbollah decided to take preemptive action against Israel in July 2006. Membersof the organization killed three and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in cross-border raids.Hezbollah proceeded by initiating a series of short-range rocket attacks against the Jewishstate. The resulting massive Israeli retaliation caused significant damage to the Lebanese infrastructureand claimed the lives of over one thousand civilians—while failing to dislodgethe true culprit, Hezbollah. After about a month of fighting, the Lebanese government announcedthat it would send 15,000 troops to the South—a move that would potentially escalatethe conflict further. However, at this point, both sides sought to end the conflict—whichwas done by U.N. Resolution 1701, which ordered a ceasefire and practically led to the end ofthe “2006 Lebanon War.” 5Though both Hezbollah (Figure 4.1) and Israel declared victory, the fact that Hezbollahwas neither destroyed nor disarmed led many to view Israel as having lost the conflict. 6 Afterall, these were the original goals Israel had stated, while Hezbollah sought to merely survive.The operations on the ground were accompanied by various cyber war techniques on bothsides. Notably, the Israelis conducted a denial-of-service attack on the Web site of Hezbollah’s
Page 2 and 3: INTRODUCTION TOCYBER-WARFARE
Page 4 and 5: INTRODUCTIONTO CYBER-WARFAREA Multi
Page 6 and 7: ContentsPreface ixForeword xiIntrod
Page 8 and 9: CONTENTSviiHow Real-World Dependenc
Page 10 and 11: PrefaceSince Stuxnet emerged in 201
Page 12 and 13: ForewordThe concept of cyber warfar
Page 14 and 15: IntroductionIt is 2006. An American
Page 16 and 17: INTRODUCTIONxvinfamous hacking grou
Page 18 and 19: BiographyPaulo Shakarian, Ph.D. is
Page 20 and 21: C H A P T E R1Cyber Warfare: Here a
Page 22 and 23: IS CYBER WAR A CREDIBLE THREAT?3sec
Page 24 and 25: ATTRIBUTION, DECEPTION, AND INTELLI
Page 26 and 27: INFORMATION ASSURANCE74. Time: Temp
Page 28 and 29: P A R T ICYBER ATTACKInformation ha
Page 30 and 31: C H A P T E R2Political Cyber Attac
Page 32 and 33: RUDIMENTARY BUT EFFECTIVE: DENIAL O
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84 6. CYBER ATTACKS BY NONSTATE HAC
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100 6. CYBER ATTACKS BY NONSTATE HA
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114 7. WHY CYBER ESPIONAGE IS A KEY
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160 8. DUQU, FLAME, GAUSS, THE NEXT
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172 9. LOSING TRUST IN YOUR FRIENDS
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186 10. INFORMATION THEFT ON THE TA
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200 11. CYBER WARFARE AGAINST INDUS
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210 12. CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST POWER
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224 13. ATTACKING IRANIAN NUCLEAR F
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242 CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF CY
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246 APPENDIX I. CHAPTER 6: LULZSEC
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258 APPENDIX II. CHAPTER 6: ANONYMO
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308 GLOSSARYDDoS distributed denial
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310 GLOSSARYNIST National Institute
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314 INDEXCyber exploitation (Contin
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316 INDEXNATO (Continued)high-level
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318 INDEXTechnical intelligence (TE
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