Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

More documents

Recommendations

Info

SUGGESTED FURTHER READING221Prior to this chapter, it was well documented that many real-world infrastructure networksare unlikely to fragment in the face of random failures. In the case of power networks, this isdue to the fact that the number of power lines connected to a given power station varieswidely in the network. However, if we consider the potential for cascading failure resultingfrom dependence on another network (i.e., the network of Internet routers), then the networkbecomes much more susceptible to random failure. To an adversary, this means that powergridnetworks highly dependent on communication infrastructure may be much easier totarget.The Buldyrev model is of great value beyond theoretical interest as in September 2003 theItalian power grid—in its communication highly dependent on the Internet—experiencedthis type of failure, resulting in power outages for large portions of the country.SUMMARYIn this chapter, we explored the potential for cyber attacks against a power grid. These attackscan be classified as component wise, protocol wise, or topology based. A basic attackmethodology for operations of this type could consist of three steps: access, discovery, andcontrol. The “Aurora Test” conducted by Idaho National Labs where a power generatorwas destroyed by way of a cyber attack is a real-world example of a component-wise attack.We also described how the topology of a power-grid network can be leveraged to enhance anattack—either by fragmenting the network or causing a cascading failure.SUGGESTED FURTHER READINGThe classification of attacks against power grids and attack methodology where introducedby Dong Wei, Yan Lu, Moshen Jafari, Paul M. Skare, and Kenneth Rohde in a paperentitled “Protecting Smart Grid Automation Systems Against Cyberattacks” published inIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid.For further information on the Aurora Test and possible counter measures, we recommendthe conference paper “Myth or Reality – Does the Aurora Vulnerability Pose a Risk to MyGenerator?” written by Mark Zeller of Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories and presentedat the IEEE 64th Annual Conference for Protective Relay Engineers in 2011.For further reading on cascading power-grid failures based on topology, we recommend“Structural vulnerability of the North American power grid” by R. Albert, I. Albert, and G. L.Nakarado published in Physical Review E.References1. Gorman S. Electricity grid in U.S. penetrated by spies, Wall Street Journal April 9, 2009; http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123914805204099085.html [accessed March 26, 2012].2. See Chapter 6.3. Wortzel LM. China’s approach to cyber operations: implications for the United States, Testimony before the Committee onForeign Affairs. House of Representatives, Hearing on “The Google Predicament: Transforming U.S. Cyberspace
222 12. CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST POWER GRID INFRASTRUCTUREPolicy to Advance Democracy, Security, and Trade.” Available at: http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/wor031010.pdf; March 10, 2010 [accessed March 26, 2012]. See also: Markoff J, Barboza D. AcademicPaper in China Sets Off Alarms in U.S. New York Times; March 20, 2010.4. Joskow PL. Creating a smarter U.S. electricity grid. J Econ Perspect 2012;26(1):29–48.5. Wei D, Yan L, Jafari M, Skare PM, Rohde K. Protecting smart grid automation systems against cyberattacks, IEEETrans Smart Grid 2011;2(4):782–95. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/login.jsp?tp¼&arnumber¼6003813&url¼http%3A%2F%2Fieeexplore.ieee.org%2Fxpls%2Fabs_all.jsp%3Farnumber%3D6003813 [accessed April 6, 2012].6. Meserve J. Sources: staged cyber attack reveals vulnerability in power grid, CNN September 26, 2007;http://articles.cnn.com/2007-09-26/us/power.at.risk_1_generator-cyber-attack-electric-infrastructure?_s¼PM:US[accessed March 15, 2012].7. Bernabeu EE, Katiraei F. Aurora vulnerability issues & solutions hardware mitigation devices (HMDs), In: IEEE2011 power and engineering society general meeting; 2011. http://www.ieee-pes.org/images/pdf/pesgm2011/supersessions/mon/Aurora_Vulnerability-Issues_Solutions_PES-GM-V2.pdf [accessed March 15, 2012].8. Zeller M. Myth or reality—does the Aurora vulnerability pose a risk to my generator?, In: IEEE 64th annualconference for protective relay engineers; 2011. http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber¼6035612[accessed March 15, 2012].9. Emanuel E, Katiraei F. Aurora vulnerability issues & solutions hardware mitigation devices (HMDs), In: IEEE2011 power and engineering society general meeting; 2011. http://www.ieee-pes.org/images/pdf/pesgm2011/supersessions/mon/Aurora_Vulnerability-Issues_Solutions_PES-GM-V2.pdf [accessed March 15, 2012].10. Zeller M. Common questions and answers addressing the aurora vulnerability. Schweitzer Engineering LaboratoriesTechnical Report. http://www.selinc.com/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id¼9487; 2010 [accessed March 15,2012].11. Ibid., Zeller 2011.12. Ibid., Bernbeau and Katiraei 2011.13. Ibid., Zeller 2011.14. Salmon D, Zeller M, Guzman A, Mynam V, Donolo M. Mitigating the aurora vulnerability with existing technology.Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Technical Report. http://www.selinc.com/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id¼6379; 2009 [accessed March 15, 2012].15. See Zeller 2011, Bernbeau and Katiraei 2011, Salmon et al. 2009 or Zeller 2010.16. Ibid., Bernbeau and Katiraei 2011.17. Wortzel LM. China’s approach to cyber operations: implications for the United States, testimony before thecommittee on foreign affairs. House of representatives, hearing on “The Google Predicament: TransformingU.S. Cyberspace Policy to Advance Democracy, Security, and Trade”, March 10, 2010. http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/111/wor031010.pdf [accessed March 26, 2012].18. Markoff J, Barboza D. Academic paper in china sets off alarms in U.S. NY Times 2010.19. Buldyrev SV, Parshani R, Paul G, Stanley HE, Havlin S. Catastrophic cascade of failures in interdependent networks.Nature 2010;464:1025–8.20. Albert R, Albert I, Nakarado GL. Structural vulnerability of the North American power grid. Phys Rev E2004;69:025103.21. Motter AE, Lai Y-C. Cascade-based attacks on complex networks. Phys Rev E 2002;66:065102R.22. Ibid., Buldyrev.
Page 2 and 3:
INTRODUCTION TOCYBER-WARFARE
Page 4 and 5:
INTRODUCTIONTO CYBER-WARFAREA Multi
Page 6 and 7:
ContentsPreface ixForeword xiIntrod
Page 8 and 9:
CONTENTSviiHow Real-World Dependenc
Page 10 and 11:
PrefaceSince Stuxnet emerged in 201
Page 12 and 13:
ForewordThe concept of cyber warfar
Page 14 and 15:
IntroductionIt is 2006. An American
Page 16 and 17:
INTRODUCTIONxvinfamous hacking grou
Page 18 and 19:
BiographyPaulo Shakarian, Ph.D. is
Page 20 and 21:
C H A P T E R1Cyber Warfare: Here a
Page 22 and 23:
IS CYBER WAR A CREDIBLE THREAT?3sec
Page 24 and 25:
ATTRIBUTION, DECEPTION, AND INTELLI
Page 26 and 27:
INFORMATION ASSURANCE74. Time: Temp
Page 28 and 29:
P A R T ICYBER ATTACKInformation ha
Page 30 and 31:
C H A P T E R2Political Cyber Attac
Page 32 and 33:
RUDIMENTARY BUT EFFECTIVE: DENIAL O
Page 34 and 35:
THE DIFFICULTY OF ASSIGNING BLAME:
Page 36 and 37:
ESTONIA IS HIT BY CYBER ATTACKS17FI
Page 38:
ESTONIA IS HIT BY CYBER ATTACKS19Th
Page 41 and 42:
22 2. POLITICAL CYBER ATTACK COMES
Page 43 and 44:
24 3. HOW CYBER ATTACKS AUGMENTED R
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
34 4. CYBER AND INFORMATION OPERATI
Page 55 and 56:
Page 57 and 58:
Page 59 and 60:
Page 61 and 62:
Page 63 and 64:
44 5. CYBER ATTACK AGAINST INTERNAL
Page 65 and 66:
Page 67 and 68:
Page 69 and 70:
Page 71 and 72:
Page 73 and 74:
Page 75 and 76:
Page 77 and 78:
Page 79 and 80:
Page 81 and 82:
Page 83 and 84:
Page 85 and 86:
Page 87 and 88:
68 6. CYBER ATTACKS BY NONSTATE HAC
Page 89 and 90:
Page 91 and 92:
Page 93 and 94:
Page 95 and 96:
Page 97 and 98:
Page 99 and 100:
Page 101 and 102:
Page 103 and 104:
Page 105 and 106:
Page 107 and 108:
Page 109 and 110:
Page 111 and 112:
Page 113 and 114:
Page 115 and 116:
Page 117 and 118:
Page 119 and 120:
100 6. CYBER ATTACKS BY NONSTATE HA
Page 121 and 122:
Page 123 and 124:
Page 125 and 126:
Page 127 and 128:
Page 129 and 130:
Page 131 and 132:
Intentionally left as blank
Page 133 and 134:
114 7. WHY CYBER ESPIONAGE IS A KEY
Page 135 and 136:
Page 137 and 138:
Page 139 and 140:
Page 141 and 142:
Page 143 and 144:
Page 145 and 146:
Page 147 and 148:
Page 149 and 150:
Page 151 and 152:
Page 153 and 154:
Page 155 and 156:
Page 157 and 158:
Page 159 and 160:
Page 161 and 162:
Page 163 and 164:
Page 165 and 166:
Page 167 and 168:
Page 169 and 170:
Page 171 and 172:
Page 173 and 174:
Page 175 and 176:
Page 177 and 178:
Page 179 and 180:
160 8. DUQU, FLAME, GAUSS, THE NEXT
Page 181 and 182:
Page 183 and 184:
Page 185 and 186:
Page 187 and 188:
Page 189 and 190: 170 8. DUQU, FLAME, GAUSS, THE NEXT
Page 191 and 192: 172 9. LOSING TRUST IN YOUR FRIENDS
Page 203 and 204: Intentionally left as blank
Page 205 and 206: 186 10. INFORMATION THEFT ON THE TA
Page 219 and 220: 200 11. CYBER WARFARE AGAINST INDUS
Page 229 and 230: 210 12. CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST POWER
Page 239: 220 12. CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST POWER
Page 243 and 244: 224 13. ATTACKING IRANIAN NUCLEAR F
Page 261 and 262: 242 CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF CY
Page 265 and 266: 246 APPENDIX I. CHAPTER 6: LULZSEC
Page 277 and 278: 258 APPENDIX II. CHAPTER 6: ANONYMO
Page 291 and 292:
272 APPENDIX II. CHAPTER 6: ANONYMO
Page 293 and 294:
Page 295 and 296:
Page 297 and 298:
Page 299 and 300:
Page 301 and 302:
Page 303 and 304:
Page 305 and 306:
Page 307 and 308:
Page 309 and 310:
Page 311 and 312:
Page 313 and 314:
Page 315 and 316:
Page 317 and 318:
Page 319 and 320:
Page 321 and 322:
Page 323 and 324:
Page 325 and 326:
Page 327 and 328:
308 GLOSSARYDDoS distributed denial
Page 329 and 330:
310 GLOSSARYNIST National Institute
Page 331 and 332:
Page 333 and 334:
314 INDEXCyber exploitation (Contin
Page 335 and 336:
316 INDEXNATO (Continued)high-level
Page 337:
318 INDEXTechnical intelligence (TE
show all

Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?