Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

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C H A P T E R13Attacking Iranian Nuclear Facilities:StuxnetO U T L I N EIntroduction 224The Alleged Target: The Natanz FuelEnrichment Facility 224How Stuxnet Targets Industrial ControlSystems 226Stuxnet Successfully Targets the NatanzFuel Enrichment Plant 228Stuxnet Was Predominantly Foundin Iran 228Stuxnet Source Code Resembles theCascade Configuration at Natanz 229The Effectiveness of Stuxnet Against theNatanz Facility 229Reactions on Stuxnet from the IranianRegime 231Was Natanz the Sole Target of Stuxnet? 232Stuxnet Is a Significant Advancementin Malware 232Stuxnet Invalidates Several SecurityAssumptions 233Implications for the Future 234Summary 235Suggested Further Reading 235INFORMATIONINTHISCHAPTER• How Stuxnet targets industrial controlsystems• Stuxnet successfully targeted the NatanzFEP• Stuxnet is a significant advancement inmalware• Stuxnet invalidates several securityassumptions223
224 13. ATTACKING IRANIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES: STUXNETINTRODUCTIONIn the previous two chapters, we discussed cyber-warfare considerations of industrial controlsystems (ICS) and the power grid. While incidents described in those chapters illustratedthat cyber warfare against ICS was possible, none of them are actual incidents of cyber war.For instance, the Maroochy water breach was a crime motivated by revenge, the Aurora Testwas an experiment, and the cascading power outage in Italy resulted from equipment failurerather than from malicious attack. In this chapter, we describe Stuxnet, which successfullytargeted the Iranian Natanz Uranium Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP). Unlike the previouslymentioned incidents dealing with ICS, Stuxnet appears to have been politically motivated,which is why we consider it an act of cyber war.Interestingly, before the discovery of Stuxnet many believed a cyber-war operation againstan industrial control system would be impossible—or at least unlikely. For instance, in 2004,Marcus Ranum asserted that the sheer complexity of the power grid would make it anunlikely target of attack. 1 However, in July 2010, the discovery of a new piece of malwareby a small Belarusian firm known as VirusBlockAda 2 changed these perceptions. The malwarediscovered would later become known as Stuxnet.In the months that followed VirusBlockAda’s discovery, there was a flurry of activity in thecomputer security community—revealing that this malware was a “worm” in other words“self-propagating” and designed to target industrial control systems (ICS). Once it wasrevealed that the majority of infections were discovered in Iran, 3 along with an unexplaineddecommissioning of centrifuges at the Iranian fuel enrichment plant (FEP) at Natanz, 4 manyin the media speculated that the ultimate goal of Stuxnet was to target Iranian nuclear facilities.In November of 2010, some of these suspicions were validated when Iranian PresidentMahmoud Ahmadinejad publically acknowledged that a computer worm created problemsfor a “limited number of our [nuclear] centrifuges.” 5Reputable experts in the computer security community have labeled Stuxnet as “unprecedented,”6 an “evolutionary leap,” 7 and “the type of threat we hope to never see again.” 8 Inthis chapter, we study how this malicious software represents a fundamental advance incyber warfare—an advance that is often called a revolution of military affairs (RMA). 9 Wefirst describe the Iranian Natanz fuel enrichment facility—which is widely thought to bethe primary target of Stuxnet. Then, we describe how Stuxnet works, why it represents anadvance in the state of the art of malware design, and how it invalidated several commonassumptions about cyber security.THE ALLEGED TARGET: THE NATANZ FUEL ENRICHMENTFACILITYNatanz was Iran’s main fuel enrichment facility at the time of Stuxnet’s supposed deployment.Its existence was brought to the world’s attention in summer 2002, while it was underconstruction, which by then was underway for 2 years, and the IAEA monitored the furtherdevelopment of the site. Apparently designed to withstand airstrikes, two cascade halls withthe capacity to hold an estimated 50,000 centrifuges each, are basically thick-walled cementboxes with 8 m of soil covering the roofs (Figure 13.1). 10
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INTRODUCTION TOCYBER-WARFARE
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INTRODUCTIONTO CYBER-WARFAREA Multi
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ContentsPreface ixForeword xiIntrod
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CONTENTSviiHow Real-World Dependenc
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PrefaceSince Stuxnet emerged in 201
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ForewordThe concept of cyber warfar
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IntroductionIt is 2006. An American
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INTRODUCTIONxvinfamous hacking grou
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BiographyPaulo Shakarian, Ph.D. is
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C H A P T E R1Cyber Warfare: Here a
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IS CYBER WAR A CREDIBLE THREAT?3sec
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ATTRIBUTION, DECEPTION, AND INTELLI
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INFORMATION ASSURANCE74. Time: Temp
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P A R T ICYBER ATTACKInformation ha
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C H A P T E R2Political Cyber Attac
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RUDIMENTARY BUT EFFECTIVE: DENIAL O
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THE DIFFICULTY OF ASSIGNING BLAME:
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ESTONIA IS HIT BY CYBER ATTACKS17FI
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ESTONIA IS HIT BY CYBER ATTACKS19Th
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22 2. POLITICAL CYBER ATTACK COMES
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24 3. HOW CYBER ATTACKS AUGMENTED R
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34 4. CYBER AND INFORMATION OPERATI
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44 5. CYBER ATTACK AGAINST INTERNAL
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68 6. CYBER ATTACKS BY NONSTATE HAC
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100 6. CYBER ATTACKS BY NONSTATE HA
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114 7. WHY CYBER ESPIONAGE IS A KEY
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160 8. DUQU, FLAME, GAUSS, THE NEXT
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Page 205 and 206: 186 10. INFORMATION THEFT ON THE TA
Page 219 and 220: 200 11. CYBER WARFARE AGAINST INDUS
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Page 261 and 262: 242 CONCLUSION AND THE FUTURE OF CY
Page 265 and 266: 246 APPENDIX I. CHAPTER 6: LULZSEC
Page 277 and 278: 258 APPENDIX II. CHAPTER 6: ANONYMO
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274 APPENDIX II. CHAPTER 6: ANONYMO
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308 GLOSSARYDDoS distributed denial
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310 GLOSSARYNIST National Institute
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314 INDEXCyber exploitation (Contin
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316 INDEXNATO (Continued)high-level
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318 INDEXTechnical intelligence (TE
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Introduction to Cyber-Warfare - Proiect SEMPER FIDELIS

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