Medicine and philosophy - Classical Homeopathy Online

148 Aristotle and his schoolAnother notable remark on the physiology of the melancholic (Insomn.461 a 23–4) is that melancholy, fever and drunkenness are ‘spirituousaffections’, with pneumatōdēs probably meaning ‘containing/producing air’(cf. On Sense Perception (De sensu, Sens.) 445 a 26). The fact that drunkennessand melancholy are mentioned together, and are both said to be‘pneumatic’ in character, will be discussed below, when I deal with Pr. 30.1(for the connection between wine and pneuma also cf. Somn. vig. 457 a16). With regard to the question of the melancholic ‘constitution’, it isworth noting that the use of the word pathos points to melancholy as adisease rather than a natural predisposition. However, it may well be thatAristotle chose the word pathos to refer to fever and drunkenness, withoutconsidering the difference (viz. that both are affections that occur sporadically,whereas melancholy is a predisposition) relevant in this context, andtherefore did not discuss it.There is a direct relation between the passages from On Divination inSleep and the remark in the Eudemian Ethics (1248 a 39–40) about theeuthuoneiria of melancholics. It is mentioned as an example of the wayin which people who lack reason and deliberation (logos and bouleusis),by means of divine movement in their soul can still be successful in theiractions and do the right thing. 35 This divine movement is probably identicalto the mechanism that Aristotle called daimonia phusis in Div. somn. 463b 15. 36 It is again striking that melancholics are categorised as belongingto the group of ‘irrational people’ (alogoi, aphrones) and that a relation isperceived between their lack of reason and their prophetic powers.3 melancholy in the nicomachean ethicsIn the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics, melancholics are mentionedon three occasions. In his treatment of lack of self-control (akrasia, 1150 b 19)35 Eth. Eud. 1248 a 39–40: ‘This entity [i.e. God] sees both the future and the present well, evenin people whose reasoning faculty is disengaged; this is why melancholics have clear dreams, forit seems that the principle works more strongly when reason is disengaged’ [i.e. ] .36 For the interpretation of this difficult chapter, and for an assessment of the differences between theviews in Eth. Eud. 8.2 and Div. somn., see ch. 8 below. With regard to the passage Eth. Eud. 1248 a39–40, the remarks made by Flashar (1962, 713 and 1966, 60 n. 2) should be noted. Flashar arguesthat there is a contradiction between Eth. Eud. 1248 a 39–40 and Insomn. 461 a 22–4 with regard tothe ‘clear’ and ‘vague’ images melancholics see in their dreams. However, he does not seem to havenoticed that the relationship between Eudemian Ethics and On Dreams is the same as between OnDivination in Sleep and On Dreams. His explanation is that this contradiction may have somethingto do with the fact that Aristotle later, in the Parva naturalia, denies that dreams could be of divineorigin, something Aristotle considered possible in the Eudemian Ethics, which may well be earlier.In my opinion this explanation is not correct, as On Divination in Sleep also says that melancholicshave clear dreams.