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chapter 8Divine movement and human nature inEudemian Ethics 8.2In Eudemian Ethics (Eth. Eud.) 8.2 Aristotle is searching for an explanationof eutuchia (), which might be defined as ‘good fortune’ – sheer luckin matters in which the lucky man does not have any rational or technicalcompetence, befalling the same man so frequently that it cannot be amatter of coincidence. 1 Textual problems, extreme brevity and looseness ofexpression as well as the enormous span of the argument make it difficultto follow Aristotle’s reasoning in detail. Yet there seems to be a consensusamong modern interpreters concerning the conclusion of the chapter. Theprincipal question was whether eutuchia is caused by nature or not (1247a 2), and Aristotle’s answer to this question, briefly summarised in 1248 b3–7, is as follows. There are two forms of eutuchia, the first of which isboth ‘divine’ (theia) and ‘by nature’ ( phusei ), 2 and the second of which iscaused by ‘chance’ (tuchē ); both forms are ‘irrational’ (alogoi), but the firstform is ‘continuous’ (sunechēs), whereas the latter is not. The first form isthe one which Aristotle has been trying to explain from the beginning; theexistence of the second form he was compelled to recognise in the courseof his argument.It appears that this first form of eutuchia is based on a kind of interactionbetween a principal divine movement (1248 a 25ff.) and a human naturalconstitution (1248 a 30–1; 39–41). Thus the explanation of eutuchia involvesa rather specific conjunction of two factors, nature (phusis) and God (hotheos), which at an earlier stage of the argument (1247 a 23–31) – and also inthe first chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (1214 a 16–24) – were distinguishedamong others as two different possible causes of eutuchia. This conjunctionThis chapter was first published in Hermes 117 (1989) 24–42.1 Actually Aristotle nowhere explicitly defines eutuchia, since the explanation of the phenomenonconsists for a substantial part in trying to attain such a definition. For an analysis of Aristotle’sargument see Woods (1982) 176ff.; and Mills (1981) and (1983).2 Spengel’s conjecture in 1248 b 4 ( ), adopted by Susemihl (1884), is no longer accepted bymodern interpreters. On ‘chance’ () as the cause of the second form see Dirlmeier (1962a) 492;Gigon (1969) 211.238