Medicine and philosophy - Classical Homeopathy Online

46 Hippocratic Corpus and Diocles of Carystusnatural principle (or as a certain group of concrete natural factors) and is nolonger conceived as something supernatural. Consequently the influence,or the manifestations, of the divine are regarded as natural processes andno longer as supernatural interventions of gods within natural or humansituations. On this view, the writer of On the Sacred Disease may be seenas the exponent of a ‘rationalistic’ or ‘naturalistic’ religiosity, or in anycase as an adherent of a more advanced way of thinking about the divine,which can be observed in some of the Presocratic philosophers as well (e.g.Xenophanes, Anaximander; see n. 14 below), and which resembles opinionsfound in the Sophistic movement, in some of the tragedies of Euripidesand in the Histories of Thucydides.On the other hand, it has been recognised by several interpreters 6 that theauthor’s criticism of the magicians, which occupies the entire first chapterof the treatise (and which is echoed several times later on), 7 reflects anauthentic religious conviction. This applies particularly to his repeatedaccusations of impiety (asebeia) and even atheism (atheos) in sections 1.28–30 (6.358–60 L.) and 1.39ff. (6.362ff. L.). In these passages the author showshimself both a defender of religion and a critic of magic: he expresses definiteopinions on what he believes to be the different domains of human actionand divine action (1.25–31, 6.358–60 L.) and on the nature of the divine in itsrelation to man (1.45, 6.364 L.), and he makes stipulations concerning thetruly pious manner of approaching the gods and making an appeal to theircleansing power (1.41, 6.362 L.; 1.42, 6.362 L.; 1.46, 6.364 L.). The religiousbelief which apparently underlies these passages is far more traditionaland less ‘advanced’ than the naturalistic theology which is reflected in thestatements on the divine character of the disease, since it appears that theauthor of On the Sacred Disease believes in a supreme divine power whichcleanses men of their moral transgressions and which is accessible to culticworship in sacred buildings by means of prayer and sacrifice.The problem I intend to deal with in this chapter is how these twodifferent sets of religious ideas are related to each other. For if it is true,6 See especially Ducatillon (1977) 163 and 180–5; cf. McGibbon (1965) 387–8 and the hesitant remarksof Nörenberg (1968) 74–6. None of these scholars, however, have satisfactorily solved the problemof this apparently ‘double-faced’ religiosity (see below).7 There is no sharp dividing line between the ‘polemical’ and the ‘positive’ part of the treatise: thepolemical tone persists through the whole text (e.g. 2.6–7, 6.366 L.; 11.5, 6.382 L.; 12.2, 6.382 L.;13.13, 6.386 L.; 17.1–10, 6.392–4 L.; 18.1–2 and 6, 6.394–6 L.), and in the polemical ch. 1 the authorrepeatedly expresses his own opinions (e.g. 1.2, 6.352 L.; 1.13–14, 6.356 L.; 1.25–6, 6.358 L.; 1.45–6,6.364 L.). References to On the Sacred Disease follow the division into chapters and sections ofH. Grensemann’s edition (1968c). Compared to the Loeb edition by W. H. S. Jones (vol. ii, 1923),Grensemann’s ch. 1 corresponds to Jones’ chs. i–iv, then 2 to v, 3 to vi and so on up to ch. 16.1–5,which corresponds to Jones’ ch. xix; then 16.6–17.1–10 corresponds to Jones xx and 18 to xxi.