Medicine and philosophy - Classical Homeopathy Online

Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 257in the theory criticised there, a specific form of divine dispensation (), whereas in 1248 a 32ff. Aristotle is thinking of a process whichdoes not consist in such a divine dispensation but in people making use ofa universal divine causality. Secondly, the theory criticised by Aristotle in1247 a 23ff. presupposes that divine dispensation regards only the ‘irrational’() people, whereas in 1248 a 32ff. not only these but alsothe ‘wise and clever’ ( ) use the divine movement; thedifference between these two classes of people in their susceptibility to thedivine movement is one of degree rather than kind, and it is based not ondeliberate divine choice but on human nature ().If this interpretation is convincing, then the discrepancy between Eth.Eud. 8.2 and Div. somn. has disappeared as well. What Aristotle has inmind in Eth. Eud. 1248 a 32ff. is the same process of interaction betweena divine movement and a human natural constitution as what he refersto as the ‘superhuman nature’ in Div. somn. 463 b 14 ( ).The only difference is that the Eudemian Ethics explicitly mentions ‘God’( ) as the starting-point () of the process, whereas in On Divinationin Sleep Aristotle seems to reject any divine influence whatsoever.But the reason for this is that in On Divination in Sleep he combats atheory which is comparable with the view, rejected in Eth. Eud. 1247a23–9, that prophetic dreams are caused by deliberate divine dispensation(). The reason why he does not explicitly mention the divineaspect of the process of interaction is that the subtleties of Eth. Eud. 8.2would certainly undermine his own purpose in On Divination in Sleep,which is to reject this popular attribution of prophetic dreams to a god. Inthe Eudemian Ethics, however, the argument does not breathe the polemicalatmosphere of On Divination in Sleep. It seems that Aristotle is arguinghere positively in defence of a view which is unlikely to be accepted by anaudience who, in accordance with the main tenets of Aristotle’s ethical theory,tend to reject any possible cause of human success which is not withinhuman control ( ) and who will cling to a rational way to successbased on and . 66 In the face of such an audience, ‘God’ () is a far more satisfactory candidate as ‘principle of movement in thesoul’ ( ) than ‘chance’ (), the rejectionof which remains implicit because of its obvious unsuitability (1248 a 22: ); and it is now easy to understand whyAristotle concludes that God is the starting-point of eutuchia only after along and tentative and often aporetic argument.66 See, e.g., Eth. Eud. 1215 a 12–20; cf.Eth. Nic. 1099 b 10ff. and 1179 b 21ff.