Medicine and philosophy - Classical Homeopathy Online

254 Aristotle and his schoolto , oritcanbe connected zeugmatically with (‘distinguish’), 54 which hasoften, though unnecessarily, been changed into (‘suppose’); inthat case the infinitive (‘use’) also depends on .Who are ‘those who are intelligent and wise’ ( )? Several interpreters (Woods (1982); Décarie (1978); Düring (1966))suppose that the ‘irrational people’ (the ) are meant, that is, the fortunatepeople () who were the subject of (‘theyhit the mark without reasoning’) in line 34. 55 But it is very unlikely thatAristotle should call these people ‘intelligent and wise’ ( ). It seems better (with Dirlmeier (1962a) and von Fragstein (1974))to identify these ‘intelligent and wise’ people with in line 33, the peoplewho possess reason. Aristotle asserts that these people too, just like theirrational people, have a prophetic capacity which is swift, but in them itactually is due to reason. 56The next sentence is taken by nearly all interpreters 57 as if it read , ‘not only’, but means ‘very nearly’, ‘almost’: the construction p q expresses that we may almost say p but in any caseq. 58 Aristotle does not want to go so far as to say that there exists such a thingas rational divination founded on reason, but he does recognise the fact thatsome people, by means of experience or habit, perform divination, 59 andthat this kind of divination is different from the irrational process by whichthe lucky people foresee the future. Given this interpretation, Dirlmeier’s(1962a) emendation of into can be discarded. is deletedby all interpreters, but it might be connected with : ‘othersalso by habit’. In any case should certainly be retained, for the object of (‘use’) is not (‘observation’), which is linguistically anawkward combination, but (‘divination’; cf. sc. ): ‘they use divination by habituation in observing’.54 I do not see how Dirlmeier can translate as ‘als abgesonderte (einfach) abtun’, for means ‘to take apart, to distinguish’ (see LSJ s.v.).55 See Woods (1982) 43, 183; Décarie (1978) 215; Düring (1966) 453.56 See Dirlmeier (1962a) 481; Effe (1970) 84; von Fragstein (1974) 376–7. The distinction betweenrational and irrational divination is made by Plato, Phaedrus 244 a–d; rational divination is referredto by Aristotle in Mem. 449 b 10 and in Pol. 1274 a 28.57 Except Jackson (1913) 198–9, who translates: ‘and it may almost be said that they should put a checkupon the divination which depends on reason. The fact is that some by experience, and others byhabit, have this power.’ However, Jackson’s translation of as ‘put a check upon’ is certainlyincorrect (see n. 54 above).58 For this use of cf. Aristophanes, Wasps 515–17: .59 Cf. Aristotle’s cautious reference to the idea, expressed by others, that divination is an (Mem. 449 b 12: ).