Medicine and philosophy - Classical Homeopathy Online

Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 239is in accordance with an assertion in Nicomachean Ethics (Eth. Nic. 1179 b21–3); the part played by ‘nature’ (phusis) as a possible cause of ‘excellence’(aretē ), Aristotle says there, is ‘not within our control, but is present inthose who are truly fortunate (eutuchesin) through certain sorts of divinecauses’. 3The problem to be discussed in this chapter concerns the discrepancybetween these two stages (1247 a 23ff. and 1248 a 25ff.) of the argument inEth. Eud. 8.2. In1247 a 23ff. Aristotle suggests as a possible explanation ofeutuchia that it is caused not by nature (phusis) but by a god or demon:or because they [i.e. these ‘fortunate’ people] are loved, as people say, by a god, andthe cause of their success is something external: just as a ship that has been builtbadly often sails better not because of itself, but because it has a good navigator,likewise the fortunate person has a good navigator. 4But this explanation is immediately ruled out by the following objection:but it is paradoxical that a god or demon should love such a person rather thanthe best or the wisest. (1247 a 28–9) 5It is obvious that Aristotle is thinking here of the popular concept of apersonal guardian deity or demon. 6 It is evident that his rejection of thisconception as a possible explanation of eutuchia is not inconsistent with hisown final conclusion that eutuchia is ‘divine’ (theia) and happens ‘throughGod’ (dia theon). 7 But the problem is that it is far from evident in whatway this final conclusion is proof against the objection stated in 1247 a28–9 about the distribution of the phenomenon among different groupsof people (‘but it is paradoxical . . .’, .), for in his finalconclusion Aristotle explicitly asserts that God is ‘moving more strongly’ inpeople who are ‘without reason’ (alogoi) than in those who practise reason,intellect and rational deliberation (logos, nous, bouleusis, 1248 a 32–4; 40–1). 83 .4 5 .6 On this popular conception see Détienne (1963) 129–30 and Hanse (1939) 8–12.7 See von Fragstein (1974) 375; Mills (1982) 206; von Arnim (1929) 12; and von Arnim (1927) 130,who argues that there is an inconsistency between 1247 a 23–31 and 1248 a 32ff. and accounts forthis inconsistency by arguing that these passages represent different stages in the development ofAristotle’s ideas.8 See Bodéüs (1981) 55 n. 44: ‘La principale difficulté vient peut-être moins d’une conception selonlaquelle Dieu pourrait intervenir dans les affaires humaines (ce dont la doctrine du nous dans la Mét.xii ne semble pas envisager les modalités) que de l’idée selon laquelle pareille intervention serait,contre toute logique, en faveur des faibles d’esprit exclusivement.’