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Aristotle on divine movement and human nature 243by Dirlmeier, 20 are insufficient to account for this discrepancy, for theproblem can be regarded as a problem of consistency both within Eth. Eud.8.2 and between Eudemian Ethics and On Divination in Sleep. It is thereforenecessary to study the part played by the distribution argument in bothcontexts.Aristotle’s assertion that it is ‘paradoxical’ (atopon) that a god should sendgifts to foolish people and not to the best and the wisest, may be understoodin the light of a passage in Eth. Nic. 1179 a 21ff. There it is argued that ifthere is such a thing as a divine concern (theia epimeleia) with human affairs,this will be directed to those people who cultivate intelligence (nous), thething in which they are most akin to the gods and in which the gods takepleasure. These people are the wise (sophoi), who act rightly and nobly, andtherefore they are the most beloved by the gods.Although it is by no means certain that Aristotle himself accepted theexistence of such a ‘divine concern’, 21 it is clear in his view that if there issuch a thing it will be concerned with the best and wisest, for they are mostbeloved by the gods just because they cultivate their intelligence. The same,hypothetical frame of argument is to be found in Div. somn. 462 b 20–2:ifthe gods really sent dreams to people – an idea which in itself is ‘irrationalon other grounds as well’ – then it would be ‘paradoxical’ 22 that they shouldsend them to simple and foolish people, not to the best and wisest. Thus thedegree to which a person is ‘loved by the gods’ (theophilēs) depends on theextent to which someone actualises ‘excellence’ (aretē, both intellectual and20 From Dirlmeier’s remarks in his commentary (1962a) it can be concluded that he has not noticedthe problem. At 1247 a 28–9 he refers to On Divination in Sleep: ‘Gegen eine von Gott verursachteTraummantik erhebt Ar. denselben Einwand: es sei paradox, daß Gott der Sender sei, das Wahrsehenaber nicht den senden sollte, sondern den gewöhnlichen Leuten’(p. 483). On 1248 a 15 he remarks: ‘er hat bezüglich der Gottgesandtheit der Träume seine Ansicht(man darf wohl sagen: später) modifiziert’ (p. 490). On 1248 a 34 he says: ‘In der Richtigkeit vonTräumen hat Ar. später keine Gottesgunst mehr gesehen. Ich beschränke mich, auf den TraktatDe divinatione per somnum zu verweisen ...und bezüglich der “Melancholiker” auf Probl. 953 a10–955a 4’ (p.492).21 This question has been hotly disputed, as has the question whether Aristotle really believed in theexistence of these ‘gods’. It is to be noted that in Eth. Nic. 1179 a 23ff., as well as in 1099 b 10ff.,Aristotle neither accepts nor rejects the conception of ‘divine concern’ ( ) and of ‘divinedispensation’ ( ); it seems that he did not want to go so far as to draw the conclusion,which in the light of his theology in its strictest form was perhaps inescapable, that there is no roomfor such divine concern. See on this Verdenius (1960) 60;Pötscher (1970) 69–71; Bodéüs (1975) 28.22 It should be noted that both in Eth. Eud. 1247 a 28 and in Div. somn. 462 b 22 the word is used, which connotes both ‘out of place’ and ‘paradoxical’: it expresses an element of surprise,either in respect to what can be, generally speaking, thought real and reasonable, or in respect to thecontext in which the element stands; as such it is often used by Aristotle to point his fingerto inconsistencies in the theories of others; cf. Ph. 196 b 1; Eth. Eud. 1239 a 1–6; Metaph. 1079 a 25;Eth. Nic. 1178 b 14.