Medicine and philosophy - Classical Homeopathy Online

54 Hippocratic Corpus and Diocles of Carystuschapter 13 the same expression is used (the wording of the whole sentence13.13 is closely similar to that of 18.1–2), 23 and since in chapter 13 the authorhas discussed the influence of winds, it seems safe to conclude that the samerestriction is intended in 18.1.Fourthly, this interpretation requires that the word theios in 18.2 is usedin two different ways without this shift of use being marked explicitly in thetext. First, in the sentence ‘these things are divine’, it indicates an essentialcharacteristic of the things mentioned, but in the following sentence it isattributed to the disease in virtue of the disease’s being related to divinefactors. This need not be a problem, since theios in itself can be used inboth ways; but it seems unlikely that in this text, in which the sense inwhich epilepsy may be called ‘divine’ is one of the central issues, the authorpermits himself such a shift without explicitly marking it. The point of this‘derived divinity’ becomes even more striking as the role assigned to thefactors mentioned here is, to be sure, not negligible but not very dominanteither. Admittedly, the influence of winds is noted repeatedly and discussedat length (cf. 10.2, 6.378 L.; ch. 13); but the effects of heat and cold canhardly be said to play a dominant part in the author’s explanation (seeabove). This may also help us to understand the use of the word prophasishere; for if the writer of On the Sacred Disease adheres to a distinctionbetween prophasis and aitios, with prophasis playing only the part of anexternal catalyst producing change within the body (in this case particularlyin the brain), 24 this usage corresponds to the subordinated part which thesefactors play in this disease. Then the statement about the divine characterof the disease acquires an almost depreciatory note: the disease is divineonly to the extent that climatic factors play a certain, if a modest part in23 13.13: 24 This is suggested by the use of aitios and prophasis in 3.1: ‘the brain is causally responsible (aitios)for this affection, as it is for the greatest of the other affections; in what manner and throughwhat cause (prophasis) it occurs, I am going to tell you clearly’ ( . Cf.10.4, 6.378 L.; 10.7, 6.380 L.). But the wholequestion, especially the meaning of prophasis, is highly controversial. Nörenberg (1968), discussingthe views of Deichgräber (1933c) and Weidauer (1954), rejects this distinction on the ground that,if prophasis had this restricted meaning, then ‘dürfte der Verfasser bei seiner aufklärerischen Absichtund wissenschaftlichen Systematik gerade nicht so viel Gewicht auf die prophasies legen,sondern er müsste vielmehr von den “eigentlichen” aitiai sprechen’ (67). However, I think thatthe use of prophasis here (apart from other considerations which follow below) strongly suggeststhat there are good reasons for questioning this ‘aufklärerische Absicht’. On prophasis and aitiasee also Lloyd (1979) 54 n. 31, and Rawlings (1975); Nikitas (1976); Robert (1976); Hunter (1982)326–31.