emittance flows is mixed, as initially remittances rise with im/migrant incomes,but later these flows decline within the context of a changing and lower demandstructure for immigrants. To mitigate the negative effects of U.S. immigrationreform for the migrant-sending regions, it is critical to reform the process ofremittances at the same time (Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. 2013). Our financial modelssuggest that financial intermediation (for example, financial products and services)of remittances would exert greater impacts across borders than immigrationreform alone, and far more than trade and investment liberalization policies(Hinojosa-Ojeda 2012, 2010).To begin systematically reversing the vicious cycle that currently exists as well asameliorate the negative impacts that may result from changes in U.S. immigrationpolicies, it is critical that immigration and remittance policies be viewed,analyzed, and implemented together with international development policiesin the migrant-sending regions. This has not been the typical approach of theU.S., where instead domestic issues (like immigration, which has clear implicationsacross borders) and development policy have remained largely independentof one another in their design and analysis. Policymakers have chosen toavoid the complexities of addressing the issues of integration, instead favoringapproaches that are limited at best, and which often do not confront the rootcauses of the issues that they aim to address. In El Salvador, these limited policyapproaches continue to ignore the deep relationships and interdependenciesthat existed between El Salvador and the U.S. prior to the war, and which haveonly increased in intensity as a result of U.S. involvement in the conflict, regionalpolitical and economic policies, and immigration and remittances beginningduring the war and continuing to the present day.The recent decade of development policy between El Salvador and the U.S.consists of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compacts, which arepoverty reduction initiatives, and more recently, the Partnership for Growth(PFG), an Obama Administration initiative to promote economic growth inpartner countries. El Salvador is one of the four countries picked for the PFG,along with Ghana, Tanzania, and the Philippines, and the same growth diagnosticmethodology created by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (HRV) has beenapplied across all four contexts to measure barriers to economic growth (Hausmann,Rodrik, and Velasco 2005). However, except for the Philippines, none ofthe countries chosen present such an intense transnational relationship with theU.S. as El Salvador does. In fact, one of the most striking problems with both theMCC and PFG is that they ignore the most characteristic elements of the relation-Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development 105
ship between the U.S. and El Salvador: migration and remittances (Seelke 2012).Despite the dominant role that migration and remittances have played in contributingto sustaining growth and improving the human development optionsin both countries, the policy prescriptions proposed by the MCC and PFG topromote economic growth and reduce poverty do not systematically addressthe elements of the current transnational vicious cycle, nor do they refer to anyof the potential opportunities that migration, remittances, or other phenomena(such as technology) present for achieving development goals.In response to the shortcomings of the PFG, the NAID Center initiated the creationof an alternative database capable of measuring and making more visiblethe influence of transnational dynamics upon the growth challenges faced in ElSalvador as well as in Salvadoran migrant communities in the U.S. The objectiveis to contribute to the debate and to the design of other sets of policy prescriptionsin both the U.S. and El Salvador, including but not limited to rational immigrationreform and related development policies. This database and the processof transnational data collection and analysis methodologies aim to serve ascomplements to the PFG’s economic analysis. By offering insight into the humandevelopment challenges and opportunities for acting across borders, the NAIDCenter hopes to contribute to the creation of more informed and coordinatedpolicies that address the root causes of the vicious cycle and capitalize upon theopportunities for arriving at a virtuous cycle (UNDP El Salvador 2014).A Longer-Term Approach to Transforming the Vicious CycleOpportunities for Transnational <strong>Remittances</strong> and DevelopmentAt the UCLA NAID Center, we are using a longer-term approach to diagnose thenature of these problems, come up with real solutions, implement these solutions,and then test the implementation. To achieve this requires a wide range ofmechanisms to help understand and diagnose the complex roots of the problem.For example, how do we diagnose the problem of why remittances remainprimarily in a cash environment and generate a vicious rather than a virtuouscycle? Is it a problem of banks, regulations, or the inability of the MFIs and creditunions to break into this cycle? We’ve been analyzing the various componentsacross the migration and remittance flows to determine the type of technology,regulatory, and/or marketing interventions that would be needed to correctthis problem. We’ve also gone further in asking and analyzing what would berequired to create a transnational ecosystem that could potentially give accessto financial services in the North and the South. Such an ecosystem would allow106 A <strong>Pardee</strong> Center Task Force <strong>Report</strong> | October 2013
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But most importantly, remittances a
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often mix in the countries of desti
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According to the World Bank estimat
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Because of its focus on the multidi
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eceiving remittances provides an en
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associations for post-conflict inst
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are proposed to avoid the associate
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Terry, D. 2005. Remittances as a De
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oader approach to post-conflict rem
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networks can be seen as “homogeno
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That personalized nature of hawala
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Customary law (xeer) and other trad
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the world (Lindley 2009, 531). Much
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ize the informal equal efforts to a
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struction and development. Means sh
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opportunities should focus on exist
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2. Dodd-Frank Act and Remittances t
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leadership. Formal payments systems
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and financial institutions. 26 Reso
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closures should be both in English
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issued a new proposed regulation De
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“closed network,” in which all
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Some guidance may be found in the p
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the use of mobile devices for money
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- Page 132 and 133: ReferencesAddleton, J. 1984. The im
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