pose a considerable risk towards the inception or continuation of a violent conflict(Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; Collier 2000; Anderson1999). Diaspora remittances in conflict-affected Somalia, for example, have beenknown to contribute to military and political purposes like rebel movements,warring factions, and localized clan conflicts over natural resources, in somecases “helping armed factions and precarious local administrations survive withoutdelivering much to the people” (Lindley 2009, 778). Although the impacts ofremittance transfers differ from one case to another, attention to proper developmentpolicies is crucial: “More thought needs to be given to the extent to whichpolicy interventions can encourage the deployment of transnational activities ina positive direction, such as towards conflict resolution or post-conflict reconstruction”(Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 27).Forced Migration and Mass Displacement:Implications for <strong>Remittances</strong>Although economic migration based remittances have received a considerableshare of attention recently, the role and dynamics of remittances in conflictaffectedsettings has remained relatively unexplored. Forced migration is asudden and unplanned event rather than a carefully devised household incomediversification strategy as is often the case with labor migration. The situationsof forced migration, however, are frequently known for heightened remittanceflows: “We often do not recognise that many of the countries where remittancesare most significant owe this largely to mass migration in the wake of recentconflicts and political upheavals—official remittances are 10 percent or moreof GDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Haiti, Lebanon, Nicaragua,and Serbia and Montenegro” (Lindley 2009, 775). Migrant remittances can be acrucial resource for avoiding further displacement: “Those who stay are highlyvulnerable and, more often than not, economically dependent. Conflict tendsto undermine both general economic stability and personal livelihoods. Copingstrategies, where possible, include economic support from relatives who havemigrated” (Fagen and Bump 2006, i).Violent conflict and poverty are interwoven and often contribute to each other.Because of that, boundaries between economic and refugee based migration areoften blurred: “What begins as economic migration may transmute into internaldisplacement or international refugee movements, and conversely, what are originallyrefugee movements may over time develop into other forms of movement”(Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 14). Different types of refugeesRemittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development 7
often mix in the countries of destination, making it difficult to distinguish remittanceflows based purely on forced migration. However, forced displacementon remittance flows and their impact on the development of the source countryhave several distinctive characteristics. First, the mass character of the exodusoften means that conflicts are usually accompanied by displacements of largenumbers of population within a relatively short time. That may also pose at leasttemporary challenges to the operation of remittance transfer systems betweenthe countries of origin and destination. Secondly, many refugees often stay inthe neighboring areas within the region instead of migrating to economicallybetter-off countries, which may result in lower levels of remittances at leastat the beginning of the conflict. Thirdly, the refugees may end up in displacementcamps and other protracted situations of uncertainty, which may furtherimpair their ability to remit: “The displaced often find themselves in a state ofprotracted limbo. Nationality or citizenship may not be easily acquired or reacquired,and is often disputed or problematic” (Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 15). Because they occur in contexts that are often governed byprofound uncertainty and instability, remittances from forced migration shouldnot be seen as deliberate and carefully planned strategies for household incomediversification and risk aversion (Lindley 2009). The lack of explicit contractswith family members in the source country renders the behavior of conflictmigrants less motivated by expectations of future return. At the same time, theurgent need of the family members left behind in conflict settings for economicsupport may be a powerful motivating factor: “Refugees might be more likelythan other migrants to remit out of altruism to meet material needs of familymembers” (Lindley 2009, 780). Therefore, despite the challenges, the remittancesof those displaced in the conflict frequently remain a primary resource foreconomic support for those left behind as well as for national development andinstitution-building of the post-conflict country.Reconceptualizing Post-Conflict Development:Policy FrameworksInsecurity and repeated cycles of violence have become primary obstacles todevelopment in many parts of the world. Conventional war between nationstates has gradually been replaced by a more chaotic and complex dynamic ofviolence, including criminal activities, trafficking and terrorism, and chroniccivil unrest (The World Bank 2011, 2). The total number of deaths from civil warsis declining, but repetitive cycles of violence facilitate other forms of illegalityand hinder economic and social development. People in conflict-affected envi-8 A <strong>Pardee</strong> Center Task Force <strong>Report</strong> | October 2013
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will be available in all cases. CFP
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Section II: Remittances in Post-Con
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Sri Lanka. The conflict also result
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Figure 2: Current Account, Trade Ba
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flows came from migrant workers in
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Informal Remittance Channels in Sri
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tory authorities, with some calls f
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4. The Role of Remittances in Post-
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Figure 1: Liberia Per Capita Income
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associations, women’s groups, alu
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Remittances to LiberiaValue of Remi
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credit because of the need to be li
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Remittance Transfers in Sierra Leon
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Knowledge RemittanceThe Liberian di
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process furthermore was a pioneerin
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Levitt, Peggy and Deepak Lamba-Niev
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Section III: Diaspora Networks andC
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Post-Conflict Development,” this
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One of the main challenges for mobi
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6. Transnational Remittances and De
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The Salvadoran Diaspora is very sig
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annually during the 1990s to less t
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Figure 2: Transnational Vicious Cyc
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The transnational vicious cycle not
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emittance flows is mixed, as initia
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individuals, communities, and famil
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areas. This issue can potentially b
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This is a breakthrough moment: afte
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Edwards, Sebastian and I. Igal Mage
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y La Distribucion Del Ingreso, 1st
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7. Remittances and Community Resili
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For quantitative data collection, a
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Remittances are perceived as playin
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the affected population. Internatio
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ReferencesAddleton, J. 1984. The im
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8. Filling the Gap in Health Staffi
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The alternative is for donors to se
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cians in the U.S. in 2000 (Clemens
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1. Remittances, Financial Inclusion
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networks, and communities. The role
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• In the present era of heightene
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the island of Kosrae, in the Federa
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and Sweden and has held visiting pr
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he organized a number of workshops
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Pardee Center Conference ReportsDev