“closed network,” in which all of the intermediaries are agents of the remittanceprovider, or through an “open network,” such as through wire transfers. 58 Anopen network is composed of intermediary financial institutions. 59 The funds aretransmitted from one financial institution to another as it winds its way to therecipient. The transaction may be routed differently, depending upon a numberof factors beyond the control of the remittance transfer provider. Therefore,when funds are transmitted through an open network, the specific intermediaryinstitutions and the exact amount of third party transaction fees cannot bedetermined beforehand. 60 When funds are transmitted to a post-conflict region,the remittance provider is less likely to have an office or other presence in theregion. As a result, in many post-conflict areas, the open network frameworkwill be an important transmission method, but the remittance provider will notbe able to determine in advance the exact route that the funds will traverse northe fees that will be imposed by third party intermediaries.The problem is worse in post-conflict nations where the transparency andsufficiency of the financial regulatory structure may be lacking. Without astrong financial regulatory structure, entities receiving remittance paymentsfor disbursement to the recipient may be able to establish fees that vary basedon local economic conditions, relationships with the consumer, or other factorsintrinsic to that particular entity. In some cultures, the exact fee that some thirdparties may charge could be subject to negotiation and bargaining between theconsumer and the paying entity. The U.S. regulatory requirements for advancenotice and/or publication of consumer fees is certainly not the norm in many58 Wire transfers are generally open network transactions that can reach virtually any bank worldwide throughnational payment systems that are connected through correspondent and other intermediary bank relationships.Providers of wire transfers usually charge up-front fees at the time of the transaction. In some cases, intermediaryinstitutions impose additional fees (sometimes referred to as ‘‘lifting fees’’) and recipient institutions may alsocharge fees for converting funds into local currency and/or depositing them into recipients’ accounts. See generallyElectronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 6194 - 6198 (in-depth discussion of open networks andwire transfers).59 Id. at 6197.60 In an open network, the sending institution may not have a contractual relationship with the receiving institution.Rather, in an open network transaction, the sending institution will send payment instructions and funds to acorrespondent institution, which will then transmit the instructions and funds to the recipient institution directly orindirectly through other intermediary institutions. The identity of the intermediary institutions is not always knownbecause more than one transfer route is possible. There is no global practice regarding communication betweenthese various institutions regarding fees. Id.Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development 49
parts of the post-conflict world, and the regulatory language does not take thatinto account. 61CFPB Response Relating to Third-Party FeesThe 2013 regulation deals with only one aspect of the problems relating tothird-party fees. It provides that such fees need not be disclosed, but only ifthey are imposed by the recipient’s institution, and only if that institution is notconsidered to be an agent of the remittance transfer provider. 62 The recipient’sinstitution must be a bank or similar financial institution, and the funds must beplaced into an “asset account,” such as a savings account or checking account.The requirement to disclose accurately all fees charged in other circumstances,for example, by intermediary institutions in an open network, was not changed.This will make the use of open networks by remittance transfer providers (otherthan depository institutions) difficult if not impossible.Definition of AgentOne practical difficulty in applying even this limited exemption is that the term“agent” is not clearly defined. The term “agent” is defined, for other purposes, tomean “agent, authorized delegate, or person affiliated with a remittance transferprovider, as defined under State or other applicable law, when such agent, authorizeddelegate, or affiliate acts for that remittance transfer provider.” 63 The 2013amendment added, however, that this definition applies “except as otherwiseprovided.” 64 The preamble explains that this “except as otherwise provided”clause was added to clarify that the term “agent” may be modified by the provisionsin the rule regarding fee disclosures. 65 However, there is no specific referenceto the definition of the term “agent” in these sections of the rule. Thus, it isnot clear to what extent the existing definition of “agent” applies to the exemptionfrom disclosure of the fees charged by the recipient’s institution.61 See, e.g., B. Narteh, Challenges of Marketing E-Banking Services in a Developing Country: The Case of Ghana, 17 J.of Internet Banking and Commerce 10 (2012), http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/jibc/; L. Brix and K. McKee,Consumer Protection Regulation in Low-Access Environments: Opportunities to Promote Responsible Finance, CGAPFocus Note No. 60 (2010).62 CFR §30(h)(2).63 12 CFR §1005.30(a).64 12 CFR §1005.30.65 78 Fed. Reg. 30666.50 A <strong>Pardee</strong> Center Task Force <strong>Report</strong> | October 2013
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Pardee Center TASK FORCE Report oct
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This series of papers, Pardee Cente
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annually during the 1990s to less t
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Figure 2: Transnational Vicious Cyc
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The transnational vicious cycle not
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emittance flows is mixed, as initia
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individuals, communities, and famil
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areas. This issue can potentially b
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This is a breakthrough moment: afte
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Edwards, Sebastian and I. Igal Mage
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y La Distribucion Del Ingreso, 1st
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7. Remittances and Community Resili
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For quantitative data collection, a
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Remittances are perceived as playin
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the affected population. Internatio
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ReferencesAddleton, J. 1984. The im
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8. Filling the Gap in Health Staffi
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The alternative is for donors to se
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cians in the U.S. in 2000 (Clemens
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1. Remittances, Financial Inclusion
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networks, and communities. The role
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• In the present era of heightene
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the island of Kosrae, in the Federa
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and Sweden and has held visiting pr
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he organized a number of workshops
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Pardee Center Conference ReportsDev