issued a new proposed regulation December 31, 2012 that would make severalsignificant changes in its original rule, 48 and at the same time announced thatit was going to delay the effective date of the February Final Rule until after itconsiders the proposed amendments. 49 On May 22, 2013 the agency publishedin the Federal Register a new final regulation making three significant changesto the remittance regulation, and setting the effective date for regulatory complianceas October 28, 2013. 50The regulatory implementation creates a number of practical complianceproblems for remittance transfer providers that could well result in increasingthe cost of, or reducing the availability of, remittance services. 51 However, theadverse impact of these regulations on remittances to post-conflict countries willbe much greater than for remittances sent to countries that have a stable andwell-functioning government with a transparent financial regulatory structure.The most significant problems include harsh penalties imposed on remittancecompanies for minor or inadvertent misstatements relating to the mandateddisclosures; the imposition of liability for the acts of literally thousands of agentsand representatives around the globe; and the costs imposed on remittancecompanies to correct mistakes even if the mistake was due to customer errors. 52Even the CFPB has expressed concern that the new regulatory structure mayresult in companies exiting the field or reducing offerings by not sending remittancesto areas where it would be more difficult to obtain the data that must be48 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 77188 (proposed Dec. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 12CFR Part 1005).49 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) Temporary Delay of Effective Date, 78 Fed. Reg. 6025 (Jan. 29, 2012).50 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 78 Fed. Reg. 30662 (May 22, 2013).51 See, e.g., Joint Trade Association Comment Letter on the Proposed Amendments to Regulation E to ImplementSection 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Federal Reserve Board Doc. No. 1419, July 22, 2011. The CFPB acknowledgedthe possibility of adverse consequences of its regulation, including increased consumer costs and a decrease in theavailability of remittance services at 77 Fed. Reg. 6201-02, 6208, 6218, 6220, 6224, 6279-82.52 Any company that fails to comply with the EFTA or implementing regulations will face civil liability for actualdamages and statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 per violation. Class action liability for each violationis capped at $500,000 or 1 percent of the net worth of the company, whichever is less. Attorney fees are alsoawarded in a successful claim. 15 U.S.C. §1693m. (2012). In addition, the CFPB may levy administrative civil moneypenalties. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o. (2012). Intentional violations are subject to criminal penalties including imprisonmentfor up to one year. 15 U.S.C. § 1693n.Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development 47
disclosed. 53 Recently, the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York announced thatin response to the new regulatory environment, it would no longer be providingremittance transfer services for its member institutions. 54With respect to remittance transfers to post-conflict nations, disclosures relatingto third-party fees and exchange rates are especially troubling. The remainderof this section will explain the nature of the compliance problems caused by theregulation, recent efforts by the CFPB to address at least some of these concerns,and why much more needs to be done in response.Disclosure of Third-Party FeesPursuant to the regulation issued on February 7, 2012, remittance transfercompanies must provide “accurate” disclosures before any money is exchanged(pre-payment disclosures) and a post-payment receipt that contains the pre-paymentinformation, as well as additional disclosures. One of the more problematicrequirements is to disclose all fees that may be charged by third parties, whetheror not the remittance transfer provider has knowledge of such fees. 55 The 2012final rule provides that insured depository institutions may make good-faith estimatesof these fees if they lack actual knowledge (at least until July 21, 2015), 56but the agency chose not to exercise its discretion to afford similar treatment toother remittance providers. 57 Thus, under the 2012 regulation, except for insureddepository institutions, fees imposed by third parties must be itemized and accuratelydisclosed, even if the amount of the fee is not known by the remittancetransfer provider when the transaction is initiated.There are several reasons why remittance providers may not be able to complywith the disclosure requirement when transmitting funds to post-conflictcountries. For example, remittance funds may be sent abroad either through a53 According to the CFPB, “some remittance transfer providers and industry associations have indicated thatsome providers are considering exiting the market or reducing their offerings, such as by not sending transfers tocorridors where tax or fee information is particularly difficult to obtain, or by limiting the size or type of transferssent in order to reduce any risk associated with mis-deposited transfers.” Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E),77 Fed. Reg. at 77190.54 Press Release, Federal Home Loan Bank of New York, FHLBNY to Stop Processing International Wire Transfers atYear-End (Nov. 30, 2012) available at http://tinyurl.com/FHLBNY-press.55 12 CFR § 1005.31. (2011).56 See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o1693O1693o-1(a)(4) (2010) (specifically authorizes the CFPB to allow insured depositoryinstitutions to use estimates for certain disclosures. . .).57 The regulation tracks the statute in this case, since 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1(a)(4) allows the CFPB to authorizeestimates for insured depository institutions until July 21, 2015, unless further extended by the agency.48 A <strong>Pardee</strong> Center Task Force <strong>Report</strong> | October 2013
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annually during the 1990s to less t
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Figure 2: Transnational Vicious Cyc
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The transnational vicious cycle not
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emittance flows is mixed, as initia
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individuals, communities, and famil
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areas. This issue can potentially b
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This is a breakthrough moment: afte
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Edwards, Sebastian and I. Igal Mage
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For quantitative data collection, a
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Remittances are perceived as playin
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the affected population. Internatio
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ReferencesAddleton, J. 1984. The im
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8. Filling the Gap in Health Staffi
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The alternative is for donors to se
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cians in the U.S. in 2000 (Clemens
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1. Remittances, Financial Inclusion
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networks, and communities. The role
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the island of Kosrae, in the Federa
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and Sweden and has held visiting pr
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he organized a number of workshops
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Pardee Center Conference ReportsDev