tory authorities, with some calls for the elimination of these channels. Sinceremittances are often the sole financial source that enables individuals affectedby conflict to rebuild homes and meet their consumption requirements, thereis a need for devising policies that would better regulate informal remittancechannels, while taking into account people with genuine needs who use thesesystems.Thus, more policy efforts need to be directed towards the reconstruction anddevelopment of the conflict-affected areas through direct collaborations with thediaspora to channel remittances into local development activities, and throughinfrastructural and rural development programs that include the direct participationof people living in these areas. Education policies, vocational trainingprograms, and public investment also need to be directed towards developingskills, well-paid jobs, infrastructural development, and towards diversifying andraising the competitiveness of merchandise exports, which would reduce thedependence on remittances and the exports of unskilled labor to meet externalfinancing needs.Given that informal channels are often the only affordable means for refugeemigrants to remit money, efforts need to be directed towards improving thetransparency of these informal remittance channels, rather than abolishingthem. One way of improving transparency could be to have rules requiringagents who transfer money through informal channels to be registered orlicensed, and rules that require informal money transfer systems to maintainrecords and details of their customers and transactions. However, since anonymityis one of the main appealing aspects of informal channels for poorermigrants, such policy effortsare likely to meet resistance.Addressing such resistancerequires greater dialogue withleaders of diaspora communitiesin order to achieve abetter understanding of theGiven that informal channels are often theonly affordable means for refugee migrantsto remit money, efforts need to be directedtowards improving the transparency ofthese informal remittance channels, ratherthan abolishing them.impacts of such policies and measures (Buencamino and Gorbunov 2002). Additionally,efforts should be directed towards more migrant-friendly policies andtowards making the remittance systems in the formal banking channel moreaccessible to poor households (Cheran and Aiken 2005).Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development 69
ReferencesArunatilake, Nisha, Suwendrani Jayaratne, Priyanka Jayawardena, Roshini Jayaweera, andDooshni Weerakoon. 2010. “Impact of <strong>Remittances</strong> on the Household of the Emigrant and onthe Economy of the Migrant’s Country: Sri Lanka.” Project report submitted for the 10th RoundRegional Research Competition of South Asia Network of Economic Research Institutes.Buencamino, Leonides, and Sergei Gorbunov. 2002. “Informal Money Transfer Systems: Opportunitiesand Challenges for Development Finance.” DESA Discussion Paper Series 26, UnitedNations.Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual <strong>Report</strong> 2011. http://tinyurl.com/SriLanka-AR2011.Cheran, R. 2003. “Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post-Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka.” Policy paper submitted to the Berghof Foundation for ConflictManagement, Berlin, Germany.Cheran, R., and Sharryn Aiken. 2005. “The Impact of International Informal Banking on Canada.”Paper prepared for the Law Commission of Canada and York University’s Nathanson Centrefor the Study of Organized Crime and Corruption.Fagen, Patricia Weiss, and Micah N. Bump. 2006. “<strong>Remittances</strong> in Conflict and Crises: How <strong>Remittances</strong>Sustain Livelihoods in War, Crises and Transitions to Peace.” Policy Paper, the Security-Development Nexus Program.Foundation for Development Cooperation. 2007. “Policy and Regulatory Framework for Remittance-SriLanka,” Brisbane, Australia.Lasagabaster, Esperanza, Samuel Munze Maimbo, and Sriyani Hulugalle. 2005. “Sri Lanka’sMigrant Labor <strong>Remittances</strong>: Enhancing the Quality and Outreach of the Rural RemittanceInfrastructure.” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3789.Lindley, Anna. 2008. “Conflict-induced migration and remittances: exploring conceptual frameworks.”Refugee Studies Center, Working Paper No. 47, University of Oxford.Lindley, Anna, and Nicholas Van Hear. 2007. “New Europeans on the Move: A Preliminary Reviewof the Onward Migration of Refugees within the European Union.” Center on Migration, Policyand Society, Working Paper No. 57, University of Oxford.Orjuela, Camilla. 2008. “Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in SriLanka’s Violent Conflict.” Global Networks 8 (4): 436-452.Puri, Shivani, and Tineke Ritzema. 1999. “Migrant Worker <strong>Remittances</strong>, Micro Finance and theInformal Economy: Prospects and Issues.” Working Paper No. 21, Social Finance Unit, InternationalLabor Office, Geneva.Sriskandarajah, Dhananjayan. 2002. “The Migration-Development Nexus: Sri Lanka Case Study.”International Migration 40 (5): 283-305.Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) 2010. Annual Statistical <strong>Report</strong> of ForeignEmployment 2010. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment Research Division, 234, DenzilKobbekaduwa Mw, Koswatta, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka.Van Hear, Nicholas. 2003. “From Durable Solutions to Transnational Relations: Home and Exileamong Refugee Diasporas.” Working Paper No. 83, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit,United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva.Zunzer, Wolfram. 2004. “Diaspora Communities and Civil Conflict Transformation.” Berghof OccasionalPaper No. 26, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin,Germany.70 A <strong>Pardee</strong> Center Task Force <strong>Report</strong> | October 2013
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This series of papers, Pardee Cente
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AcknowledgementsThis Task Force on
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ITU International Telecommunication
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networks and migrant associations i
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to developing countries than other
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But most importantly, remittances a
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often mix in the countries of desti
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According to the World Bank estimat
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Because of its focus on the multidi
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eceiving remittances provides an en
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associations for post-conflict inst
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For quantitative data collection, a
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Remittances are perceived as playin
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the affected population. Internatio
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ReferencesAddleton, J. 1984. The im
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8. Filling the Gap in Health Staffi
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The alternative is for donors to se
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cians in the U.S. in 2000 (Clemens
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1. Remittances, Financial Inclusion
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networks, and communities. The role
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• In the present era of heightene
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the island of Kosrae, in the Federa
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and Sweden and has held visiting pr
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he organized a number of workshops
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Pardee Center Conference ReportsDev