For quantitative data collection, a structured questionnaire was administered to602 households in four Union Councils (UC), two in each selected district (Swatand Lower Dir). The sample was stratified by gender to give representation towomen (out of 602 households structured questionnaires, male and female representationis 69 and 31 percent, respectively). In addition, we also conductedtwo Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), one in each district, with male migrantsfrom the community.Remittance Case Study: The Swat and Lower Dir Districts ofKhyber PakhtunkhwaSwat and Lower Dir districts feature some of the highest numbers of workers registeredfor overseas employment in 2012 (17,995 and 19,196, respectively—GoP2013). Both districts are situated in the Hindu-Kush mountain range and faceheavy environmental pressures, including the adverse impacts of the climatechange. Weather conditions are harsh, with extensive snowfall in winter anddrought in summer. Excessive precipitation causes damage to the traditionalmud-built kacha houses, and also causes landslides (Steimann 2005; Siegmann2010). The misuse of natural resources that has intensified since the merging ofthe Swat princely state with Pakistan in the 1970s has led to significant deforestation(Khan 2007). These climate-induced risks are further aggravated byneglected road infrastructure in the area. The flood of 2010 that killed more than2,000 people, washed away thousands of homes, and destroyed several roadsand bridges further devastated the region.KP has also witnessed a dramatic escalation in incidents of terrorism over thelast decade. “Talibanization” of the area peaked in 2007, leading to frequentbombings of schools, places of worship and hospitals, target-killings andkidnapping, and other types of widespread violence (UNDP 2012). The Malakanddivision, and particularly the Swat district together with FATA (FederallyAdministered Tribal Area) were most affected by the insurgency, resulting in asevere conflict costing thousands of lives. The warfare led to mass displacementof the population in various parts of the province. The authority of the state waseventually reestablished through a full-scale military operation in 2009. Yet,insurgent attacks are still widespread in both districts and the situation remainsprecarious.In our sample, 22 percent of the surveyed households were affected by the 2010flood and 90 percent by the conflict, while nine percent were not affected byeither.Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development 119
Key findingsAccording to our survey, the great majority of migrants were employed in theGulf (92 percent), with Saudi Arabia being the top destination. There are severalreasons for this, including the fact that Saudi Arabia has a long history of cooperationwith Pakistan. Obtaining a visa to the Gulf is easier and less expensivethan to Western countries.Because of prevailing patriarchal norms, such as the system of Purdah that prescribessegregation between sexes, labor migrants are almost exclusively male.This was reflected in our sample where all migrant workers were male andoverwhelmingly migrating alone, without the family (95 percent).The custom of migrating to the Gulf is widespread in the area to the degree thatneither conflict nor environmental hazards (such as the 2010 flood) were consideredhaving played a direct role in the decision to migrate. A large number of therespondents (94 percent) have identified “Poverty/Lack of economic opportunitiesin situ” as the only determinant for migration. Migrant educational status wasfound to range mostly between illiterate (22 percent) and 10th grade (59 percent).Regarding the type of employment, almost half of the migrants (43 percent) wereengaged in unskilled labor, 25 percent in semi-skilled labor, 25 percent wereskilled laborers, while four percent and three percent were agricultural laborersand professionals, respectively.Social ties proved crucial in facilitating the migratory process as 59 percent ofthe respondents were able to reach the destination country thanks to help withvisa provisioning from a relative residing in that country. Thirty-seven percent ofthe respondents resorted to a recruiter, while the remaining either crossed theborders illegally or were sponsored by relatives or friends.Hundi/Hawala 2 is the most common way of sending remittances back home(59 percent), followed by bank transfers (26 percent), and transfers by compatriotsworking in the destination (eight percent). Telebanking (easy paisa) is availableonly for internal migrants. Five percent of the respondents were found to beunable to remit as they were still repaying the costs of migration.2 For a detailed description and discussion of the Hawala system, see Section I of this volume, “’Informal’ RemittanceSystems and Post-Conflict Development.” Hawala plays an extremely salient role in Pakistan as it presentsmany advantages as compared to formal value transfer systems, including swiftness, easy accessibility, freedomfrom bureaucratic procedures, as well as cost-effectiveness. Higher trust is also a factor as hawala is often accessedvia family or social networks and is embedded within the Islamic tradition (Ballard 2003). On the otherhand, the anonymity and efficiency of hawala may facilitate the channeling of money for illegal operations, includingsmuggling, money laundering, tax evasion, and terrorism (Fagen and Bump 2006).120 A <strong>Pardee</strong> Center Task Force <strong>Report</strong> | October 2013
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AcknowledgementsThis Task Force on
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networks and migrant associations i
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to developing countries than other
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But most importantly, remittances a
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often mix in the countries of desti
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According to the World Bank estimat
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Because of its focus on the multidi
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eceiving remittances provides an en
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associations for post-conflict inst
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are proposed to avoid the associate
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Terry, D. 2005. Remittances as a De
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oader approach to post-conflict rem
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networks can be seen as “homogeno
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That personalized nature of hawala
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Customary law (xeer) and other trad
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the world (Lindley 2009, 531). Much
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ize the informal equal efforts to a
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struction and development. Means sh
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opportunities should focus on exist
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2. Dodd-Frank Act and Remittances t
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leadership. Formal payments systems
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and financial institutions. 26 Reso
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closures should be both in English
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issued a new proposed regulation De
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“closed network,” in which all
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Some guidance may be found in the p
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the use of mobile devices for money
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Foreign TaxesUnder the 2012 regulat
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will be available in all cases. CFP
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Section II: Remittances in Post-Con
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Sri Lanka. The conflict also result
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Figure 2: Current Account, Trade Ba
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flows came from migrant workers in
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Informal Remittance Channels in Sri
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