(Fagen and Bump 2006). Somali money transfer companies have also helpedforge ties between different development actors and facilitate diversified servicesinvolving deposit, microfinance, and investment functions (Lindley 2009, 537).However, the prolonged lack of state administration has had some negativeeffects on the Somali remittance environment. The lack of a central bankcoordinating the country’s financial affairs has left it up to the remittance agentsto ensure the security of their transactions in a context of profound instability.Insufficient national regulatory institutions to unify operational and reportingmechanisms of remittance transfers in an environment of growing internationaldemands for greater transparency poses a disadvantage for Somali financial networks(Omer and El Koury 2005). On the whole, however, the rapid developmentof Somali remittance infrastructure demonstrates the relevance of local initiativein conflict-affected situations: “On the surface, the landscape is one of poverty andanarchy, but underneath, it is the true entrepreneurial spirit and unification ofprivate industry that prevails” (238).Informal value transfer systems like hawala are often used by internationaldevelopment agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to transferfunds for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. As formal financial infrastructureoften has been severely damaged, informal transfer options remain the onlymeans to transport large amounts of cash among the regions in need (Hariharan2012, 290). In Afghanistan, hawala has been used by international developmentactors for efficient and reliable transportation of funds across the country sincethe fall of the Taliban (Maimbo 2003). Such transfers have amounted to severalhundreds of millions of US dollars in reconstruction and relief funding, and tensof thousands of dollars are transmitted daily by various NGOs within the country(4). The process is fast, with international transfers taking about 6–12 hours, aswell as cost-effective, with transfer fees at around 1–2 percent; the internationalNGOs interviewed reported “general satisfaction with the delivery of funds” (5).The local hawaladars enable local NGOs necessary liquidity and develop checksand other financial products to assist NGOs in their transactions with suppliersand shopkeepers in the area (13).The Hybrid Nature of Modern HawalaThe complex remittance environments described above also highlight certainarbitrariness in the formal/informal dichotomy. Despite a chronic lack of centralizedstate administration, Somali remittance networks are more centralizedand transnationally regulated than hawala arrangements in many other parts ofRemittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development 29
the world (Lindley 2009, 531). Much of their resilience and commercial viabilityderives from their “hybrid” organizational character, which consists of “a centralhierarchical hub” that draws upon an extensive and fragmented agent network(535). Even outside Somalia, a distinguishing feature of the modern-day hawalais its integral connectedness to the formal financial sector. Hawala operatorsfrequently employ formal banking services like savings accounts for depositingand consolidating funds: “A majority of international hawaladars hold at least oneor two accounts with formal financial institutions” (Hariharan 2012, 283). Hawalatransfers are also heavily dependent on modern information and communicationtechnologies—including fax, email, telephone, and radio communicationand various combined financial service platforms. At the same time, people oftenresort to informal financial institutions like rotating savings groups to mobilizefunds for hawala transfers (see also Ballard 2003). Informal and formal elementsthus intersect and overlap in remittance transfer systems, resulting in increasinglycomplex “hybrid” arrangements on multiple scales.Because of the growing ambiguities between formal and informal spheres inremittance transfers, Pieke, Van Hear, and Lindley (2007) have suggested thatthe term “informal remittance transfers” should be seen as a residual category,defined by elements that it fails to possess according to certain regulatory concerns.The precise form of these concerns cannot be easily determined because ofthe variety of criteria considered relevant on each occasion, which may include“financial regulation, registration, licensing or supervision, law enforcement, orrequirements to keep records, report transactions, or confirm to certain accountingconventions” (359). As the legal and regulatory environments as well as theorganizational systems of “informal” transfers like hawala do not remain constant,it is difficult to define the attributes of that informality. That poses particularchallenges to the efforts to regulate hawala-like remittance systems.Concerns of Abuse and Regulatory IssuesThe high degree of fragmentation and anonymity of hawala transfers rendersthem vulnerable to criminal and terrorist activities. A lack of documentationabout hawala transfers is exacerbated by the relative isolation of individual transactionswithin the hawala chain. The fragmented hawala channels can be seenas “labyrinths replete with pseudonyms, middlemen and dead ends” (Looney2003, 166) and the governments often lack the capacity to monitor the dispersedtransactions. As hawala transfers often form part of other commercial transactions,the actually circulating values can be easily obscured. The settlement end30 A <strong>Pardee</strong> Center Task Force <strong>Report</strong> | October 2013
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credit because of the need to be li
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Remittance Transfers in Sierra Leon
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Knowledge RemittanceThe Liberian di
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process furthermore was a pioneerin
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Levitt, Peggy and Deepak Lamba-Niev
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Section III: Diaspora Networks andC
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Post-Conflict Development,” this
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One of the main challenges for mobi
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6. Transnational Remittances and De
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The Salvadoran Diaspora is very sig
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annually during the 1990s to less t
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Figure 2: Transnational Vicious Cyc
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The transnational vicious cycle not
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emittance flows is mixed, as initia
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individuals, communities, and famil
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areas. This issue can potentially b
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This is a breakthrough moment: afte
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Edwards, Sebastian and I. Igal Mage
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y La Distribucion Del Ingreso, 1st
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7. Remittances and Community Resili
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For quantitative data collection, a
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Remittances are perceived as playin
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the affected population. Internatio
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ReferencesAddleton, J. 1984. The im
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8. Filling the Gap in Health Staffi
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The alternative is for donors to se
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cians in the U.S. in 2000 (Clemens
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1. Remittances, Financial Inclusion
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networks, and communities. The role
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• In the present era of heightene
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the island of Kosrae, in the Federa
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and Sweden and has held visiting pr
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he organized a number of workshops
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Pardee Center Conference ReportsDev