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According to the CEA’s narrative, this rising tide<br />

of shared growth continued until 1973. But the shape of<br />

inequality during this period begs closer scrutiny, as postwar<br />

growth put increasing pressure on the idea of the middle<br />

class as an attainable aspiration for all. The report’s<br />

authors acknowledge that they exclude “non-economic<br />

dimensions” in favor of a focus on productivity, income<br />

inequality, and participation, and that those crafting domestic<br />

policy should take this into account. 24 Nevertheless,<br />

the discursive segregation persists. Record low levels<br />

of income inequality during the 1950s did not exist in economic<br />

isolation. Instead they must be thought of together<br />

with inequalities based on gender, race, and sexuality—<br />

the separate-but-equal cul-de-sacs, highways, and lunch<br />

counters that made “shared growth” with one’s middle-class<br />

neighbors imaginable at all [See HH: 1949, 2012].<br />

In marked contrast to the generally positive<br />

picture painted by the CEA, discrimination and segregation<br />

in the housing market not only persisted, but were<br />

produced and maintained by governmental programs.<br />

Redlining in loan distribution meant that mixed-race or<br />

all-black neighborhoods were considered high-risk in<br />

governmentally insured mortgage programs, which effectively<br />

meant that no loans were available in those areas.<br />

25 On a private level, restrictive covenants in housing<br />

developments placed limits on who could live where and<br />

how they could do so on individual parcels. 26 Accordingly,<br />

the post-war expansion of access to housing wealth largely<br />

excluded black households, with strong repercussions<br />

for the intergenerational transmission of wealth inequality.<br />

27 In 1950, 57 percent of white households owned their<br />

homes compared to 35 percent of non-white households.<br />

By 1970, these numbers were 65 percent and 42 percent,<br />

respectively. 28 Among all housing units financed by Veterans’<br />

Affairs and FHA loans between 1946 and 1959, less<br />

than 2 percent were bought by black households. 29<br />

In public housing, which was shrinking in availability<br />

during this period, access to shared growth was not<br />

only more limited, it was increasingly segregated as well. 30<br />

In Los Angeles, the composition of public housing tenants<br />

shifted from 55 percent white and 30 percent black<br />

in 1947, to 14 percent white and 65 percent black (with 19<br />

percent of Mexican origin) by 1959. 31 In Chicago, 60 percent<br />

of Chicago Housing Authority tenants were black<br />

in 1948, compared to 95 percent in 1984 [See HH: 1954,<br />

1962]. These post-war spatial arrangements were also divisive<br />

along gender lines. Inner-city public housing populations<br />

in large cities like Chicago were quickly shifting<br />

from mainly two-parent families to households headed<br />

by females and receiving public assistance. 32 Meanwhile,<br />

suburban environments were criticized for isolating women<br />

physically and socially by distancing them from jobs,<br />

childcare services, and opportunities for social interaction<br />

and support, while tying them to traditional norms of domesticity.<br />

33 These segregations simultaneously reinforced<br />

comparable discrimination against people of any gender<br />

with non-normative sexual orientations. Though the narrative<br />

of shared growth and decreasing income inequality<br />

in the postwar U.S. economy is accurate in many ways,<br />

the contours of the middle class among whom this growth<br />

was distributed were in flux, and embedded inequalities<br />

of all kinds were far from mitigated by over-determined<br />

notions of economic growth.<br />

1.2.3.2 “The Age of Expanded Participation (1973–1995)”<br />

As a result of cultural shifts responding to some<br />

of these very inequalities, the CEA points toward “expanded<br />

participation” as the dominant economic paradigm for<br />

the period from 1973 to 1995. 34 With the legal incorporation<br />

of women, racial minorities, and other historically<br />

marginalized groups into the market economy, globalization<br />

was coming into focus as a phenomenon pertaining to<br />

46 47

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