of affordable units in market-rate developments. In some high-priced cities, including Boston or San Francisco, inclusionary zoning is mandatory for buildings above a certain number of units. 26 In others, like New York City, it is incentivized through higher densities, subsidized through tax abatements, or both. 27 The practical problem with these strategies is that generating new income- and price-restricted housing is directly tied to the real-estate cycle: if the development of market-rate apartments stalls, development of below-market rate units will stop. The more principled problem is that the goals of private for-profit development—return on investment—are not reconcilable with the goals of affordable housing development—creating housing accessible to low-, moderate- and middle-income households. By definition, the latter cannot pay what would generate acceptable profits, at least not in high-priced cities, leading to what some have called a “Faustian pact” between the public and private sectors. 28 In New York City, historically an exception both in terms of the excesses of its property market, and due to successive administrations’ commitment to regulate housing, this balancing act has proven difficult. A recent debate exemplifies the contorted political negotiations around the issue of how to combat inequality in and through housing: whether new affordable housing developments subsidized by New York City should require contractors to pay prevailing wages. A key official argued against this requirement, which would have combatted income inequality through wages, calculating that it would result in a reduction of 17,000 affordable units being built. 29 The city’s policies of furthering mixed-income housing through density bonuses and inclusionary zoning have evolved over the years. City agencies renegotiate depending on site, subsidies, and variances granted, sometimes permitting the affordable units to be realized entirely off site, other times allowing for them to be concentrated in one part of a building, and in yet other instances demanding they be spread indistinguishably throughout the development. 30 For instance, in “The Toren,” a highrise in downtown Brooklyn completed in 2012, designed by Skidmore Owings & Merrill for BFC Developers, all of the affordable apartments were confined to the five-story base of the building, while the tower was reserved for market-rate units. 31 In the summer of 2014, a scandal erupted around a more egregious architectural variation of this mixed-income policy at One Riverside Park, a luxury condominium tower on the Upper West Side developed by Extell Developers and designed by Goldstein, Hill & West. 32 In exchange for a 25-year property tax abatement as well as a density bonus, the project was required to include 20 percent affordable apartments. It did so not within the building, but in an adjacent one, named Fifty Riverside Boulevard. The 291 residences of One Riverside Park have sunset views across the Hudson River, and the units include up to 7-bedroom duplex apartments with swimming pools located on private terraces. The 55 income-restricted apartments count no more than two bedrooms, are accessed from around the corner, and have more basic amenities, including bicycle storage. The creation of a “poor door” was first reported by a neighborhood blog in late 2013, and the newly coined term helped spur the story’s international coverage. 33 Though from the street the two buildings are distinguishable, with the midrise affordable section clad in more stone and the high-rise luxury section in more glass, together they create a whole. And yet the difference between the amenities on the one side and those on the other are so extreme that public discomfort was immediate. It was that very real and graspable architectural image of two separate entrances—not just personnel and service staff in the back, residents and guests in the front, 72 73
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- Page 5 and 6: Preface The Art of Inequality: Arch
- Page 7 and 8: Introduction What is inequality? Or
- Page 9 and 10: to tangible evidence drawn from rea
- Page 11 and 12: 1.1 Defining Inequality Jacob Moore
- Page 13 and 14: ership rate, this became especially
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- Page 25 and 26: According to the CEA’s narrative,
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1996 Stephen E. Roulac, Roulac Glob
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25. James A. Graaskamp, “Redefini
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3.4.2 600 Harrison Avenue, Boston,
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3.4.4 TerraSol, Salt Lake City, UT
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1. In the foreword to a publication
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dictionary of real estate terms glo
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dictionary of real estate terms glo
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dictionary of real estate terms glo
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dictionary of real estate terms glo
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dictionary of real estate terms glo
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Appendix 214 215
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Botein, Hilary. “New York State H
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Glaeser, Edward. “There are Worse
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Kopczuk, Wojciech, Emmanuel Saez, a
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Renner, Andrea. Housing Diplomacy:
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Weiss, Marc A. “Researching the H
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1939 1937 1934 1933 1932 FHA DENIES