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C05356748
PPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: .
3-Mar-2016
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Military development will continue to suffer from budget constraints.
Furthermore, with no significant military industries or alternative suppliers,
the government will probably have to continue to spend a large
proportion of US aid on ammunition and other expendibles at the expense
of longer term investments in military hardware and training. We expect
financial pressures to grow as the war intensifies, the payroll expands, loans
come due, and medical and death benefits burgeon.
Since a breakthrough appears unlikely on the battlefield over the short
term, political factors may hold the key to the strategic balance. The
actions of the new Christian Democratic government of Napoleon Duarte
will influence both the level of US aid and the amount of attention the defense
leadership gives to the war effort. Certainly, continued indications
that the armed forces are resigned to a new relationship with civil authority
would permit military leaders to concentrate more fully on the war; m;1 the
other hand, if top leaders become preoccupied with political events in San
Salvador for an extended period of time, they would be unable to
orchestrate combat actions, and potential tactical opportunities could lie
dissipated.
Washington's leverage in further accelerating the development of the
Salvadoran armed forces is constrained by Salvadoran culture and institutions.
Considerable strides have been made in the technical modernization
of the Salvadoran military, but, in our judgment, leadership attitudes and
institutional procedures still require significant additional changes to meet
the guerrilla threat. These have shown the least improvement over the past
few years, both because of the slow pace of institutional evolution and
sensitivity over the US role. Recent reorganization and reassignments of
military commanders, combined with changes in civilian leadership as a
result of the 1984 elections, may result in some acceleration of the needed
changes.
We believe US pressure to promote force development can, if not carefully
orchestrated, strain El Salvador's capacity to absorb new technology and
force-management ideas and nurture a counterproductive dependence on
the United States. Greatly expanded or more sophisticated assistance
would probably require the United States to increase its advisory presence
substantially to enable the Salvadorans to make use of the aid, thus risking
leaving Salvadoran officers feeling that they were not in control and
weakening the resolve of the High Command ..
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