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Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach ... - Law Commission

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Though it brings together the two questions, we have no quarrel with this<br />

statement. The conclusion being reached is that the policy holder knew that the<br />

statement was incorrect <strong>and</strong> must have known that the statement might be<br />

relevant to the insurer. We agree that in this sort of case a finding of recklessness<br />

is justified.<br />

4.75 However, saying that a policyholder must have known is very different to saying<br />

merely that they ought to have known. The latter is only negligence. It is not<br />

dishonest <strong>and</strong> in our view it should be treated differently. As we explain later, in<br />

cases of negligence the insurer should not have an automatic right to avoid. We<br />

think that the outcome should depend on what the insurer would have done had it<br />

known the truth. 52 This should apply even where the negligence was more than<br />

slight carelessness.<br />

4.76 We have received comments in response to our Issues Paper arguing that it is<br />

essential to allow the insurer to avoid a policy as of right when, for example, the<br />

proposer has not revealed that they are a smoker. We think our proposals would<br />

have this effect. A proposer who smokes knows that they do so. If in answer to a<br />

specific question, for example “do you smoke or have you done so in the last x<br />

years”, they answer “no” when the true answer is “yes”, the only possible<br />

conclusion is that they were at least reckless or most probably deliberate – they<br />

“must have known”. 53<br />

4.77 What this shows is that there is a need for clearer guidance on the difference<br />

between acting without the requisite degree of honesty – “deliberately or<br />

recklessly” – <strong>and</strong> acting without the requisite degree of care.<br />

Our definition<br />

4.78 In our view, an insurer should be entitled to avoid the policy if the proposer has<br />

made a deliberate or reckless misrepresentation, that is, if they make a<br />

representation which they both:<br />

(1) know to be untrue (or know may be untrue, <strong>and</strong> make nonetheless, not<br />

caring whether or not it is true); <strong>and</strong><br />

(2) know to be relevant to the insurer (or know may be relevant <strong>and</strong> do not<br />

care whether or not it is relevant).<br />

There are several points to make about this definition.<br />

Motive is not relevant<br />

4.79 First, motive is irrelevant. It is not necessary for the insurer to show that the<br />

proposer was attempting to get something for nothing. They may, for example,<br />

fail to mention a previous bout of depression because they are embarrassed by it,<br />

rather than because they wanted cheaper insurance.<br />

52 See para 4.154 below.<br />

53 The proposer might be able to rebut the natural presumption that they must have known by<br />

showing that the form was so badly designed that they ticked the “no” box meaning to tick<br />

the “yes” box, but it would take some doing. If so, the remedy is in the insurer’s h<strong>and</strong>s.<br />

90

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