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Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach ... - Law Commission

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Section 5 Identification of the potential impact of the reforms<br />

The slight change in the definition of reckless/inadvertent/negligent claims<br />

means that there is the possibility that there will be an increase in the number<br />

of claims paid relating to negligent misrepresentation <strong>and</strong> a change in the<br />

average size of claims paid due to the introduction of the principle of<br />

proportionality in relation to these types of claims. It is likely that the small<br />

increase in the number of claims paid will slightly increase the average<br />

premium paid by consumers all other things being equal <strong>and</strong> the current<br />

subsidisation of some consumers will cease (or diminish).<br />

The proposed changes to the legislation will have a greater effect on Type 2<br />

firms compared to Type 1 firms.<br />

In terms of the number of claims <strong>and</strong> eventual payouts, it is probable that<br />

Type 2 firms will have to pay more claims where there has been nondisclosure,<br />

or innocent or negligent misrepresentation, as Type 2 firms<br />

(according to our definition) currently avoid policies for these reasons.<br />

However, it is likely that rather than the ‘all or nothing’ payouts currently<br />

being made, a number may result in proportionate payouts. Therefore, it<br />

might be the case that the average size of each claim paid will decrease,<br />

though the total monetary value of all claims paid may increase. The<br />

aggregate impact of the proposed changed will increase the average<br />

premiums paid by consumers currently purchasing insurance policies from<br />

these (Type 2) firms.<br />

In the analytical framework presented, we have assumed that consumers of<br />

these firms may also be more price-sensitive than consumers of Type 1 firms.<br />

As we have assumed that the policies of Type 2 are on average 5% cheaper<br />

than the policies of Type 1 firms, if there is an increase in the price of Type 2<br />

firms’ policies then there is likely to be a greater reduction in the quantity of<br />

insurance dem<strong>and</strong>ed from Type 2 firms compared to Type 1 firms.<br />

We think that the proposed changes to the legislation will disproportionately<br />

affect the premiums charged by Type 2 firms. These firms will see a reduction<br />

in their current unit cost advantage <strong>and</strong> there is likely to be some degree of<br />

customer migration away from Type 2 firms to Type 1 firms. This may result<br />

in some Type 2 firms reacting by either operating less profitably, exiting the<br />

marketplace altogether or fundamentally altering their behaviour or business<br />

model <strong>and</strong> essentially converting themselves into Type 1 firms (if considered<br />

a more profitable long terms strategy).<br />

We would appreciate the views of consultees on the validity of these expected<br />

impacts on firms.<br />

Clarity of Questionnaires<br />

As previously mentioned, insurance companies will not be allowed to avoid a<br />

policy for reasons of non-disclosure. Insurers will be expected to ask<br />

questions about any matter that is material to them. It is therefore likely that<br />

the questionnaires administered by all organisations will have to be amended<br />

with an increased onus on clarity <strong>and</strong> transparency.<br />

London Economics<br />

June 2007 36

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