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Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach ... - Law Commission

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4.49 We ask whether the rules on what constitutes a misrepresentation <strong>and</strong> on<br />

inducement should be stated expressly in any new Insurance Contracts<br />

Act.<br />

DELIBERATE AND RECKLESS MISREPRESENTATIONS: ACTING WITHOUT<br />

HONESTY<br />

4.50 Where an insured has induced the contract by a misrepresentation that was not<br />

honest, it is right that a penalty should be imposed, even if it results in overcompensating<br />

the insurer for the loss they have suffered. As Lord Steyn stated in<br />

Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Citibank, 31 a generous measure of damages is<br />

appropriate where the misrepresentor has behaved in a morally reprehensible<br />

way. This shows society’s disapproval of the behaviour <strong>and</strong> discourages<br />

wrongdoing. Similarly, where a policyholder is morally blameworthy, the insurer<br />

should be permitted to avoid the contract from the start. This is true even if, had<br />

the insurer been given the correct information, it might still have accepted the risk<br />

with only a slight increase in premium.<br />

4.51 Below we also ask whether insurers should be entitled to keep the premium in<br />

these circumstances. 32<br />

The confusion over fraud<br />

4.52 In our first Issues Paper, we said that if the proposer has made a dishonest or<br />

reckless misrepresentation, the insurer should always be entitled to avoid the<br />

contract. We described this behaviour as fraudulent. We set out the common law<br />

definition of fraud in civil cases, as given in Derry v Peek: 33 the representor must<br />

either know that the statement is false or have “no care whether it is true or<br />

false”. If the insured also knew that the statement was material to the insurer (or<br />

realised that it might be material <strong>and</strong> did not care whether it was or not), we said<br />

that the insured had behaved fraudulently.<br />

4.53 The case where the consumer knows the statement to be false is often referred<br />

to as deliberate fraud, while simply not caring is typically referred to as<br />

recklessness. According to Derry v Peek, both are fraudulent.<br />

4.54 The responses we received did not necessarily disagree with the definition we<br />

put forward, but there was widespread concern over our use of the word “fraud”.<br />

This was for three reasons: fraud is often associated with a criminal offence;<br />

there are social inhibitions against alleging fraud; <strong>and</strong> the FOS uses the word in a<br />

particular way. We explore each below. The result was that respondents thought<br />

that we were limiting the insurer’s right to avoid much more severely than was our<br />

intention.<br />

31<br />

[1997] AC 254, 280.<br />

32 See paras 4.95 <strong>and</strong> 4.98.<br />

33 Derry v Peek (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337.The concept of fraud in Scots law has a different<br />

history from that in English law, but as regards fraudulent misrepresentation inducing a<br />

contract, the test for proving fraud set out by Lord Herschell in Derry v Peek has been<br />

adopted in Scots <strong>Law</strong>. See Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow & South Western Railway Co 1912<br />

SC (HL) 93 ; Robinson v National Bank of Scotl<strong>and</strong> 1916 SC (HL) 154.<br />

84

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