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Misrepresentation, Non-Disclosure and Breach ... - Law Commission

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A discretion to prevent avoidance in harsh cases<br />

4.177 In general, we think that a compensatory remedy will be fair between the parties.<br />

However, it may operate harshly in some cases where an insurer shows it would<br />

have declined the risk <strong>and</strong> the whole policy is effectively avoided.<br />

4.178 One problem is where the individual insurer would have declined the risk but<br />

others would have accepted it for only a small increase in premium. Another is<br />

where the insurer would have declined the risk, but for reasons that have nothing<br />

to do with the claim in h<strong>and</strong>. Suppose, for example, a consumer negligently failed<br />

to recognise subsidence cracks, <strong>and</strong> the subsidence was so serious that the<br />

insurer would not have accepted the subsidence risk. It seems perfectly<br />

reasonable to permit the insurer to refuse a subsidence claim. But it may seem<br />

harsh to permit the insurer to refuse to pay for fire damage that was not<br />

connected with the subsidence in any way.<br />

4.179 The position may seem even more unfair if the action was negligent only on a<br />

strictly objective test, rather than one that takes account of the insured’s<br />

particular circumstances. Earlier we gave the example of a recently bereaved<br />

widow who left house maintenance to her husb<strong>and</strong>. Although an objectively<br />

reasonable consumer should have recognised the effect of the crack over the<br />

door, in her subjective circumstances, it was reasonable for her not to notice<br />

them. However, under the rules we have outlined, the insurer may refuse the fire<br />

claim if it could show it would have declined the risk altogether had it known the<br />

true facts.<br />

4.180 We would welcome views about whether the courts or the FOS should have a<br />

discretion to mitigate the harsh effects of avoidance in some cases. Such a<br />

discretion could be used where the policyholder’s negligence was minor, <strong>and</strong><br />

where the insurer has not suffered substantive prejudice (or where any prejudice<br />

that it has suffered could be adequately compensated by a reduction in the<br />

claim).<br />

4.181 We note that the Australian <strong>Law</strong> Reform <strong>Commission</strong> recommended such a<br />

discretion even for fraud. They thought that in some circumstances avoidance<br />

could be seriously disproportionate to the harm suffered by the insurer. They<br />

therefore recommended that courts should have a discretion not to avoid, but<br />

instead to adjust the rights of the parties, having regard to all relevant facts,<br />

including the need to deter fraudulent behaviour. This recommendation was<br />

implemented in the Insurance Contract <strong>Law</strong> Act 1984. 87<br />

4.182 In our view, however, this is excessively lenient towards dishonest behaviour. It is<br />

our intention that a discretion to prevent avoidance in appropriate circumstances<br />

should apply only where the misrepresentation is negligent.<br />

87<br />

Insurance Contract <strong>Law</strong> Act 1984, s 31; see Rob Merkin’s, Reforming Insurance <strong>Law</strong>: Is<br />

There a Case for Reverse Transportation?<br />

http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/merkin_report.pdf.<br />

110

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