the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

the French. Bagration was “to attack on his own account and throw back the extreme left
wing of the enemy, which by then would be giving way. He must also strive to unite with
the remaining columns of our army.” To support Bagration, Weyrother dispatched part
of Prince Liechtenstein’s column to the north. 70 In addition, the Russian Imperial Guard
under Grand Duke Constantine was deployed on Bagration’s left flank.
The Allied plan looked perfect on the paper. However, neither Weyrother nor any
other Allied commander knew the strength or exact deployment of the French army. The
plan was based on assumptions and limited information obtained by the patrols. 71 As one
of the German contemporaries observed, “The allies adopted the plan of action against
the army they had not seen yet, assuming it on the positions it never occupied. Moreover,
they expected the French to remain inactive as the frontier posts.” 72
Some officers remained suspicious of this plan. Langeron described it as
absolutely incompetent and wrote, “Did [Weyrother] betray us? Or was he merely not up
to the job which was given to him?” Weyrother laid out the plan of attack “on an
immense, very detailed and exact map… and read to us his dispositions in a loud tone
and with boasting air, which announced in him the intimate persuasion of his own merit
and that of our incompetence.” 73
70 Disposition for Attack, RGVIA f. 846 op. 16, d. 3117/1, ll. 50-53. Late evening of 1
December, Bagration was reinforced by a detachment of Elisavetgrad Hussar, Chernigov
Dragoon, Kharkov Dragoon Regiments under command of General Adjutant Uvarov.
Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign of 1805, 150.
71 Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign of 1805, 151. Czartoryski recalled, “Everything in
the French army seemed to announce a resolution to attempt a retreat. It was therefore decided to
advance, in order to take advantage of this disposition of the enemy.” Memoirs, 105.
72 Bulow’s Assessment of Austerlitz, in Shilder, Alexander, 284. 284. (Based on von Bulow,
Der Feldzug von 1805 militarisch-politisch betrachtet von dem Verfasser des Geistes des neuern
Kriegssystems, (??, 1806), II, 66).
73 When Weyrother bragged he knew the terrain around Austerlitz very well, Colonel Bubna
noted, “I hope you will not commit the same mistakes as at the maneuvers last year.”
Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Campaign of 1805, 151.
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