the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

wrote, “I organized marches in such a manner that all three corps arrived at the Trajan’s
rampart at the same time.” 65
Hearing about Bagration’s movement, the Grand Vizier deployed Hozrev
Mehmet Pasha with 8,000 men near Trajan’s rampart and then marched with his
remaining troops to Giurgiu. He wanted Hozrev Mehmet to tie down Bagration at
Trajan’s rampart, while he crossed the Danube and attacked Bucharest, threatening
Bagration’s right flank. 66 However, Bagration anticipated the Turkish move. He
dispatched one of his corps under Peter Essen to reinforce General Alexander Langeron
at Bucharest. 67
Bagration moved his left corps under Markov at the dawn of 7 September,
followed by Platov at noon and Miloradovich the next morning. He personally led the
advance guard and engaged a Turkish patrol at Satiskoy on 8 September. The Russians
captured several Turks whom Bagration later interrogated. The prisoners told him that
the Turks moved reinforcements to Constanta to threaten the Russian left flank. 68
Therefore, Bagration ordered Miloradovich to stop at Cernavoda to cover his right flank
against Hozrev Mehmet Pasha, 69 while Platov and Markov proceeded to Constanta. A
reconnaissance detachment under Major General Denisov VI was dispatched to locate the
enemy positions. Denisov soon encountered a Turkish detachment at Kara-Murat and, in
a brief engagement, he captured seven men, including the beyraktar (standard bearer).
65 Bagration to Alexander, No. 955, 18 September 1809, Ibid., 69. Under Bagration’s
disposition, Miloradovich was moving to Cernavoda on the Danube, Platov proceeded to Caras
and Markov advanced to Constanta. Langeron noted that the corps were moving at 7-8 hours
marching distance from each other. Langeron, Recollections, Russkaia starina, 134 (1908): 686.
42.
66 Dubrovin, “Materials for the History of Reign of Alexander,” Voennii sbornik, 10 (1864):
67 Some Russian authors praise Langeron’s actions during this period. Langeron did not trust
local officials, whom he justly suspected of being bribed by the Turks. Therefore, Langeron
concealed his correspondence and the deployment of his troops. When Bagration sent the
reinforcements, Langeron instructed Essen III to avoid the major route to Bucharest and move his
troops across the countryside. As a result, the Turks were unaware of the troops marching to
reinforce Langeron. Petrov, Influence of the Russo-Turkish War, 243.
68 Bagration to Alexander, No. 955, 18 September 1809, Correspondence of Bagration, 69.
69 Langeron, Recollections, Russkaia starina, 134 (1908): 687.
499