the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

the Danube can prevent these maneuvers, as the last spring demonstrated to us….
[Besides], the Turks and British can anticipate our actions in the spring” 85 In response,
Bagration repeated his previous arguments. He argued that, with only some 20,000 men,
he was unable to take the stronghold of Silistra without sustaining high casualties. The
Grand Vizier’s army of 40,000 men was in the vicinity, ready to attack the Russians at
any moment. Prince Peter observed that even if the Turks did not attack, the cold weather
and lack of supplies would decimate his troops. When Alexander noted that Ottoman
army was always disbanded in the fall, Bagration responded,
[It is often] assumed that the Turkish troops usually return to their homes
[in the fall]. To be more precise, first of October is usually considered the
date when the Asian troops and the Janissaries leave the army. However,
under the recent firmans [decrees] of the sultan, and perhaps for other
reasons unknown to me, the army of the grand vizier still remains in the
field; although some detachments [occasionally] leave, others arrive to
reinforce it. Therefore, I consider it impractical to rely on previous
campaigns when the reality shows us different picture. 86
So, Prince Peter “chose lesser evil of retreating [from Silistra] to preserve… the
army for future operations.” 87 He believed he had justifiable reasons when he withdrew
his army from Silistra. His predecessors acted indecisively and failed to establish an
effective supply network. There was only one central supply depot at Galati that
distributed provisions directly to the army. Although, there were a few magazines in
Wallachia, they hardly sustained the three divisions Bagration had deployed there.
Supply trains were unable to keep up with the army during the operations. The army
lacked even the fodder for horses and Bagration had to significantly reduce it. 88 There
were only a few good roads and the wagon trains, usually moving across the rough
terrain, were delayed for days. In addition, there was always a threat of Turkish
detachments raiding the countryside, harassing the Russian communication and supply
85 Alexander to Bagration, No. 238, 6 November 1809, Voennii sbornik, 1 (1865): 19.
86 Bagration to Alexander, 22 November 1809, Voennii sbornik, 1 (1865): 20-21.
87 Ibid., 20-21.
88 Order to Army, 18 November 1809, Danubian Correspondence of Bagration, 47.
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