the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

To this end, Davout’s army, which had reached Minsk by 8 July, was divided into
two columns. The first group, led by Davout, advanced southeast, leaving open the area
of Bobruisk which might serve as an escape route for the 2 nd Western Army, while the
troops of Jérôme Bonaparte threatened Bagration from the rear. Another group, under the
command of General Grouchy, was dispatched to seize Borisov and cut off a possible
escape route of the 2 nd Western Army. The advance guards of both armies were on the
move immediately after the occupation of Minsk, and within a few days the main forces
were also in motion. 122
By 12 July, Grouchy approached Borisov. The defense of this fortress was poorly
organized and its reconstruction not yet finished. The garrison consisted of two engineer
units, two reserve Jager battalions, and Cossacks. The total number of garrison was only
400 men, under the command of Colonel Alexander Gresser. There was no field artillery
in Borisov and only sixteen cast-iron siege cannon. Bagration ordered Gresser to leave
the city if the enemy approach within 30 versts [20 miles], 123 without awaiting for
further orders, to spike all guns, throw them into the river, and then withdraw to
Moghilev 124 With Grouchy’s advance to Borisov, Gresser evacuated Borisov,
destroying all warehouses and ammunition. 125 The garrison burnt the bridge over the
122 Davout, Memoires et souvenirs, II, 77-79; Mémoires du Maréchal de Grouchy, III, 51-
52; Hourtoulle, Davout, 222-24, 230; Inostrantsev, Operations of the 2 nd Western Army, 260-64;
Rostunov, General Bagration: ocherk polkovodcheskoi deiatelnosti [General Bagration: Survey
of Military Career, hereafter cited as General Bagration] (Moscow, 1957), 201-202.
123 One “versta” is equal to 0.663 mile.
124 Inostrantsev, Operations of the 2 nd Western Army, 258-59; Eugene Tarle, Napoleon’s
Invasion of Russia (New York, 1942), 111; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, I, 363.
125 Inostrantsev, Ibid., 258-59. Fabry, Campaign de Russie, I, 363. Russian historian
Rostunov acknowledged that the Russians burnt 1,960 quintals of flour, 183 quintals of oats,
2345 quintals of straw and 19,500 pounds of hay. Over 100 pounds of gunpowder were poured
into the Berezina and all cannons were destroyed or damaged. General Bagration 202.
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