the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

At the same time, Davout began his preparations for the battle. His forces,
reduced by the fatigues of the marches, were still further weakened by the strategic
consumption. The effective forces at his command to oppose Bagration’s army amounted
to only 22,000 infantry and some 6,000 cavalry. 25 Taking into account the superiority of
Russians, 26 Davout positioned his troops at Saltanovka. His left was deployed on the
marshy bank of the Dnieper and was unassailable. A stream flowing in a difficult ravine,
spanned from the village of Saltanovka by a wooden bridge, covered his front. A heavy
forest surrounded the village especially on the northern bank of the stream, and both the
stream and the village strengthened the French, though, the southern flank was
vulnerable. Davout reinforced these positions with additional earthworks. 27 His soldiers
cut the bridge at Fatova, fortified the buildings on the high road, and established strong
batteries there. He deployed five battalions of the 108 th Line and one battalion of the 85 th
Line here. Behind them he placed four battalions of the 61 st Line in reserve between
Fatova and Selets. On the left wing, at Saltanovka, Davout arranged three battalions of
25 Thiers, Consulate and the Empire, VIII, 45; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, II, 107; Davout,
Memoires et souvenirs, II, 81; Gallaher, The Iron Marshal, 234; Kharkevich, Deistvia kn.
Bagrationa v 1812 [Prince Bagration’s operations during 1812 campaign], Voenno Istoricheskii
Sbornik, 1913, No.3, 181-82; Smith, Greenhill Napoleonic Wars Data Book, 382; Nafziger,
Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 123-124; Vigier, Davout, 81; Davout himself referred to some
12,000 men. He wrote to Berthier that “At Moghilev I had only the 57 th , 61 st and 111 th infantry
regiments of Compans’ division, Valence’s division and the 3 rd regiment of Chasseurs”, Davout
to Berthier, 7 August 1812, Correspondance du maréchal Davout, prince d'Eckmühl, ses
commandements, son ministère, 1801-1815, (hereafter cited as Correspondance du maréchal
Davout) (Paris, 1885) No.1075, III, 376.
26 On 22 July Davout’s reconnaissance captured and interrogated aide-de-camp of General
Paskevich, who informed them the composition of the 2 nd Western Army (4 infantry divisions, 2
cavalry corps and Cossacks). Fabry, Campaign de Russie, II, 102-103.
27 After the battle, Bagration complained the French positions were virtually impregnable
and the forest prevented him from exploiting his cavalry superiority. He wrote, “The 8 th Corps
could not have been used at this place because the 7 th Corps itself barely arranged its forces, while
the cavalry remained completely idle.” Bagration to Alexander, 25 July 1812, No. 440,
Headquarters’ Archives, XIV, 117-18.
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