the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

To conceal direction of his retreat, Barclay de Tolly moved his troops in two
columns on different routes - General Dokhturov with the 5 th , 6 th Infantry and 2 nd and 3 rd
Cavalry Corps and the reserve artillery moved through Prudische to Solovyevo. General
Nikolay Tuchkov I with 2 nd , 3 rd , 4 th and 1 st Cavalry Corps marched to Gorbunovo and
then to Lubino. 90 Besides, Barclay de Tolly was concerned with a gap between the 1 st
and 2 nd Western armies, while Bagration was nearing Dorogobouzh, about fifty miles
from Smolensk, a perilous opening developed where Napoleon might drive a wedge
between two armies. To cover the withdrawal of his army, Bagration left a rear guard
under General Andrey Gorchakov, instructing him to cover the Moscow road and march
eastward toward Dorogbouzh as soon as the 1 st Western Army came into a view. On 19
August, General Gorchakov, seeing the advancing troops from Gorbunovo (it was just
General Tuchkov’s detachment), thought that the entire 1 st army was on the march;
consequently, he withdrew only a screening force of three hundred Cossacks. 91 Thus, the
Danilevsky, Opisanie Otechestvennoi voini 1812 goda [Description of the patriotic War of 1812],
(St. Petersburg, 1839), II, 121; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, IV, 504; Vigier, Davout, 90. Bertin,
La Campagne de 1812, 54-63
Although almost all the Russian sources refer to 20,000 French casualties, the French and
English sources acknowledge about 10,000 killed and wounded, Thiers, History of Consulate and
the Empire, VIII, 86-87; Ségur, Histoire de Napoléon I, 264; Chambray, Histoire de l’expedition
de Russie, I, 330; Denniée, Itineraire de l’empereur Napoleon, 52; Chandler, The Campaigns of
Napoleon, 786; Elting, Military Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 113; Nafziger, Napoleon’s
Invasion of Russia,195; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, IV, 504. Napoleon himself acknowledged
4,000 men. Napoleon to Maret, Correspondance de Napoleon Ier., No.19098, XXIV, 182.
90 Muratov, Historical Survey of Patriotic War and its Reasons, 80; Josselson, Barclay de
Tolly, 126; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, IV, 628-38, 747-60. The march of the 1 st Western Army
became confused at the very beginning and created a critical situation. The units of the second
column marched after midnight, lost contacts with each other and several regiments withdrew in
the wrong direction, mistaking the village of Gedeonovo for Gorbunovo. They wandered all night
long, their nocturnal march became a loop that brought them back at daybreak to the St.
Petersburg suburb of Smolensk facing Ney’s troops. After a short skirmish with the French, they
finally managed to disengage and procede as planned.
91 Muratov, Historical Survey of Patriotic War and its Reasons, 80; Gourgaud, Gaspard,
general, Napoléon et La Grande Armée en Russie, ou examen critique (Paris, 1825), 164-65;
Löwenstern, Zapiski [The Notes], Russkaya Starina, 12 (1900): 559; Nafziger, Napoleon’s
Invasion of Russia. 197-98.
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