the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

urged the expediency of acting on the offensive. Colonel Carl Toll presented a plan,
claiming the moment appeared appropriate for a counteroffensive. Intelligence reports
revealed Napoleon’s troops were scattered around Vitebsk with some of troops being in
cantonments and others still moving up from around Moghilev. Napoleon presently had
some 185,000 men scattered in the country between Beshenkovki, Surazh and Orsha. 3
The Russian army totaled some 120,000-130,000 men 4 so a resolute Russian offensive,
they believed, should easily defeat the French corps separately. Toll suggested attacking
the French at Rudnya in an attempt to break through the center of Napoleon’s army and
then defeat its scattered forces piecemeal. 5
There was naturally considerable divergence of opinion. Despite his previous
agreement with Bagration and the heavy pressure from the other generals, Barclay de
Tolly was sceptical about its outcome and refused to commit himself to an attack. His
aide-de-camp Löwenstern recalled that “on the one hand, he [Barclay] was aware of the
possible gains from the maneuver, while on the other, he saw the dangers of attacking a
far superior force and engaging… in a maneuvering match with that past master –
3 The Grand Army was deployed in the following positions: the 5 th and 8 th corps were around
Moghilev and to the south on the banks of the Dnieper; the 6 th Corps, the Imperial Guard and the
4 th Corps were at around Vitebsk (where the imperial headquarters was set up) and northern area;
the 1 st , 3 rd Corps and Murat’s cavalry were between Orsha and Rudnya. Chandler, The
Campaigns of Napoleon, 782; Elting, Military Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 111; Thiers,
History of Consulate and the Empire, VIII, 83; Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia,
113-15; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, III, 612; Denniée, Itineraire de l’empereur Napoleon, 44.
4 Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 113-15; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, III, 612;
Denniée, Itineraire de l’empereur Napoleon, 44; Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 782-83;
Troitsky, 1812: The Glorious Year of Russia 106; S. Shvedov, “Komplektovanie, chislenost’ i
poteri russkoi armii v 1812 g,” [Organization, Strength and Losses of the Russian army in 1812],
Istoria SSSR, No.4 (1987): 131-32; Beskrovny, The Patriotic War of 1812, 30.
5 V. Kharkevich, Barklai de Tolly v Otechestvennuyu voinu posle soedineniya armii pod
Smolenskom [Barclay de Tolly After the Junction of Armies at Smolensk During the Patriotic
War] (St. Petersburg, 1904) 7-8; Zhilin, Destruction of the Napoleonic army in Russia, 119;
Clausewitz, The Campaign of 1812 in Russia, 113-15; Fabry, Campaign de Russie, III, 612;
Bogdanovich, The Patriotic War of 1812, I, 221.
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