the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

Both armies spent the whole day of 6 September preparing for the battle. By the
afternoon Napoleon’s dispositions were complete. On the French right, Poniatowski’s 5 th
Corps was lined up on the old road to Utitsa. To the right centre, east of Shevardino,
stood Davout’s 1 st Corps, consisting of generals Louis Friant’s, Joseph Dessaix’s and
Jean-Dominique Compans’ divisions. To the rear of Davout were the cavalry corps of
Nansouty, Montbrun and Latour-Maubourg. Marshal Ney’s 3 rd Corps was on Davout’s
immediate left, with Junot’s 8 th Corps and the Imperial Guard behind it. Eugene’s 4 th
Corps, reinforced with Morand’s and Gerard’s divisions, formed left wing of the Grand
Army across the Kolotcha river at Borodino. Grouchy’s Cavalry Corps and the Italian
Guard were deployed behind Eugene’s troops. General Philippe-Antoine Ornano’s
cavalry covered the extreme left. 33 Napoleon’s plan of attack was uninspiring. The
Emperor decided to launch straightforward frontal attack, with diversions on the flanks.
Under the cover of the artillery fire, Poniatowski was to advance along the old route,
occupy Utitsa and threaten Russian left flank. The divisions of Compans and Dessaix
would move against Bagration’s fléches; once this attack was under way, Ney was to
advance to Semyenosvkoe with the 3 rd Corps. Meanwhile, Eugene’s troops were to seize
Borodino and then swing right across the Kolotcha River and storm the Raevsky’s
Redoubt. 34
Kutuzov deployed his forces with Barclay’s 1 st Western Army on the right flank
and Bagration’s troops deployed on the left. On the extreme right were General Carl
33 Denniée, Itineraire de l’empereur Napoleon, 67; Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon,
798-99; Elting, Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, map 116; Du Casse, Albert. Memoires et
correspondance politique et militaire du prince Eugene (Paris, 1859), VIII, 2-3; Holmes,
Borodino, 36; Duffy, Borodino, 85-86; Nafziger, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 224, 229.
34 Ordre pour la bataille, 6 September 1812, Correspondance de Napoleon Ier., No.19181,
XXIV, 239; Tarle, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 190; Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon,
796-97; Beskrovny, The Patriotic War of 1812, 53; Denniée, Itineraire de l’empereur Napoleon,
67. Foord, Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, 204-205; Zhilin, Patriotic War of 1812, 156-57. It
should be noted that Marshal Davout proposed an outflanking maneuver on the Russian left flank.
Given the shortness of the Russian line and manifest weakness of their left wing, Davout
suggested to attack in a powerful encircling movement through the Utitsa woods; Napoleon
turned this proposal down on the grounds that it was too dangerous. Thiers, Consulate and the
Empire VIII, 130; Davout, Memoires et souvenirs, II, 95; Gallaher, The Iron Marshal, 246.
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