the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

left wing was tangibly weak in comparison with other sectors of our position. The
fortifications there were incomplete and time was so short that there was nothing we
could do to strengthen them.” 41 Besides, Kutuzov told Barclay and Bagration to proceed
freely; so they were able to seize initiative in combat, but they did not change their low
opinion of the aged Kutuzov as a tactical commander. 42
The strength of the Russian army is still a matter of controversy, with numbers
varying from 120,000 to 135,000 men. 43 But recent research proved that by 7 September
the Russians had 154,634 soldiers, of whom 115,134 men were regular troops, 44 and 640
41 Borodino: Documents, Letters and Recollections, 351.
42
Notwithstanding the facts, Soviet scholars followed the official indoctrination and
attempted to depict Kutuzov as a great strategist, who anticipated Napoleon’s every movement
and reacted accordingly. Zhilin justified Kutuzov’s decisions and stated that Kutuzov actively
took part in the battle. Beskrovny praised Kutuzov’s strategy and called him “strategist of the
world significance”, while Garnich claims Kutuzov had a “precisely elaborated plan” and
understood Napoleon’s designs on attacking left flank, but “did not consider it necessary to make
any changes in the deployment.” Zhilin, Patriotic War of 1812, 173; Beskrovny, The 150 th
Anniversary of the Patriotic War, 95. Garnich, Commander Kutuzov: A Compilation of Articles,
178, 193-94.
43 Beskrovny, The Patriotic War of 1812, 50; Zhilin, Patriotic War of 1812, 155; Muratov,
Historical Survey of Patriotic War and it’s Reasons, 93; Tarle, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia,
188; Duffy, Borodino, 87; Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 796, 799; Foord, Napoleon’s
Russian Campaign, 200-01; Josselson, The Commander: a Life of Barclay de Tolly, 135;
Sokhvadze, Boris, 1812 tslis samamulo omis gmirta istoriidan [From the History of The Patriotic
War of 1812], (Tbilisi, 1988), 182; Smith, The Napoleonic Wars Data Book, 392; Garnich, N.
Borodinskoe srazhenie [The Battle of Borodino], Polkovodets Kutuzov: sbornik statei
[Commander Kutuzov: A Compilation of Articles], (Moscow, 1965), 192-93; Austin, Napoleon’s
Invasion of Russia (The March on Moscow), 262.
44 According to the reports of the commanders-in-chief, the 1 st Western Army was numbered
75,373 men (not including Cossacks and militia) and 420 guns. Kutuzov was informed that the 1 st
Western Army enlisted 67,391 soldiers and 7,982 officers; artillery consisted of 144 position, 200
light and 76 horse guns. Report on the composition of the 1 st Western Army, 6 September 1812,
Kutuzov: a Compilation of Documents, IV, 147; also Borodino: Documents, Letters and
Recollections, 27, 75; Kutuzov reported 113,323 men (not including Cossacks and militia) in
both armies. Alexander to Kutuzov, 5 September, 1812, Kutuzov: a Compilation of Documents,
IV, 138.
Bagration’s 2 nd Western army enlisted 39,761 soldiers. By the end of August, the 2 nd Western
Army amounted to 34,925 men. On 31 August it was reinforced with 4976 men, but lost some
140 men at rearguard actions from Gzhatsk to Shevardino. Kutuzov: a Compilation of
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