the lion of the russian army - Florida State University

Bagration was preparing to move his main forces onto the mainland but was
concerned that the diplomatic negotiations would prevent him from stepping on the
Swedish soil. His expectations were correct. Arakcheyev unexpectedly halted his
advance after he gradually realized the grave consequences if Bagration’s expedition
failed, both for the army and, more important, for himself. Therefore, he wanted to secure
his future by sending a letter to St. Petersburg asking Alexander for permission to
advance. Considering the distance and time necessary to receive this permission,
Arakcheyev’s actions simply wasted precious time that Bagration needed for invasion. 164
So, while Bagration remained at Åland Islands, Barclay de Tolly and Shuvalov
marched in their directions to Umeå. Barclay with some 3,500 men left Vaasa on 18
March and marched across Östra Kvarken. “As far as the eye could see, [there was] an
immense desert of snow; the granite island of [Vallgrund] appeared to be dead nature’s
tombstone. No sign whatsoever of life… no trees, no bushes, no means of protecting
oneself. It was fifteen degrees [Celsius, 6F] of frost, but the troops had to camp without
fire and tents.” 165 By 21 March, Barclay’s troops, after an excruciating march over the
164 Ordin, Conquest of Finland, 421. Ordin held Arakcheyev directly responsible for halting
Bagration, noting, “Arakcheyev was scared [of consequences].” Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky
described the situation in vague terms. He wrote, “Our generals did not venture to continue
march and were satisfied with the capture of Åland [islands] and awaited response from
Stockholm on the peace conditions Count Arakcheyev communicated to Döbeln. Count
Arakcheyev was against the [generals’] decisions and referred to Emperor Alexander’s orders to
cross the Åland Hav; however [Arakcheyev] did not show the firmness typical of him on this
occasion.” Thus, Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky blamed ‘our generals’ for not venturing into Sweden,
but he failed to name these senior officers. Considering Bagration’s actions in the beginning of
expedition, it is doubtful that he would oppose the crossing of Åland Hav and advancing on
Stockholm. He was the only general who supported this plan from the very beginning. Certainly,
commander-in-chief General Knorring was one of the generals opposed to the continuation of the
expedition, and probably he influenced Arakcheyev. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky correctly noted
that Arakcheyev wrote Alexander for permission to continue to advance, “though he was already
authorized to act on his own discretion.” Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, War in Finland, 388-89.
Alexander gave Arakcheyev “unlimited authority throughout Finland” in early March. Alexander
to Arakcheyev, 7 March 1809, in Shilder, Alexander, 238. Also see, Borodkin, History of
Finland, 195, 199-200. Borodkin cited conversation between Bulgarin and Arakcheyev, when the
latter credited himself for entire success of the operations in March 1809.
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