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SEKE 2012 Proceedings - Knowledge Systems Institute

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hospital had its local security policy to manage the privileges<br />

of its local users. We also assumed that the following<br />

roles existed in the two hospitals: doctor, nurser, aduser<br />

(an user in the administrative staff), and ITuser (a user in<br />

the information technology staff), and that in both hospitals<br />

a patient had a medical report, data related for payment<br />

and sensitive data which was related to personal information<br />

such as previous medical report, insurance company,<br />

etc.<br />

In this case study we only focus on one interaction way:<br />

from hospital A to hospital B. Therefore, the resources to<br />

be accessed are located in hospital B and the VPO will be<br />

VPO A2B .<br />

Figure 3. Architecture of TestGen-IF.<br />

4.1. Modeling the System Under Test<br />

is mandatory to instantiate them. The instantiation of an<br />

abstract test case is composed of two sub-processes: the<br />

concretization (addition of details) and the translation to executable<br />

scripts. The final test case is a script that contains<br />

details of the implementation such as the real values of variables<br />

and the signals of the test case. This script will be<br />

executed in the O-grantee system to stimulate this system<br />

generating specific request to the O-grantor.<br />

Regarding the verdict, when we apply the inputs of the<br />

test case on the O-grantor system, the generated set of outputs<br />

has to be conform with respect to the test. However, a<br />

rule can be only checked when the rule holds. Thus, in the<br />

case where the security rule is constrained by a context, an<br />

additional information that gives the state of this context is<br />

needed in the tests.<br />

The test verdict is built based on the information on the<br />

security rule context and the behavior related to the execution<br />

of the test case. Following we present the test verdict<br />

after executing a test case.<br />

Verdict = ¬(Test case ⊕ context) (1)<br />

Remark that the global verdict, that is the verdict after<br />

performing all the test cases, has the form of a conjunction<br />

of the verdicts produced for each test case. Therefore if the<br />

verdict of one test case is false the global verdict is also<br />

false.<br />

4. Case Study<br />

In this Section we present our testing methodology approach<br />

through a hospital network case study. A hospital<br />

network is a network or group of hospitals that work together<br />

to coordinate and deliver a broad spectrum of services<br />

to their community in an O2O scenario. We considered<br />

the case where the hospital network consists of two hospitals,<br />

hospital A and hospital B. It was assumed that each<br />

Next we introduce the interoperability security policy<br />

objectives that describe the privileges of employees of the<br />

hospital A in B and belong to VPO A2B . These interoperability<br />

security policies represent a set of objectives that hospital<br />

B must respect when it is accessed by the employees<br />

of hospital A. The complete interoperability security policy<br />

is composed of 11 objectives. Due to space limitations<br />

following we only describe 3 of them.<br />

The first one focus on the following situation. A doctor<br />

from Hospital A has accessed to restricted and sensitive<br />

information of a patient of Hospital B after filling a non<br />

release form. The second one represents that the system<br />

must notify to any doctor when one of his/her patient’s medical<br />

reports is edited by another doctor. In particular if it is<br />

edited by a doctor of a different hospital. Finally, the last<br />

one focus on the nurse role. A nurse from hospital A is not<br />

allowed to create, drop or edit any data of a medical report.<br />

After defining the objectives, the interoperability security<br />

policy objectives are modeled according to the O2O<br />

model. As a result we got in this case study 53 different<br />

security rules.<br />

Next, both hospitals were modeled within extended automata<br />

using the IF language. Note that these models, do<br />

not specify the complete behavior of the hospitals but a partial<br />

one which is related to the interoperability security policy<br />

that we have to test.<br />

We integrated the O2O rules in the automata applying the<br />

methodology described in [11]. This integration process increase<br />

the number of states and transitions of the original<br />

automata. Following we present some metrics of the integration<br />

process.<br />

# States # Transitions # Signals<br />

Before int. 3 10 15<br />

After int. 4 12 17<br />

467

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