SEKE 2012 Proceedings - Knowledge Systems Institute

Objectives Partial
graph
Depth
limit
Visited
states
Time to
generate
generation the test
cases
53 BFS 100 12855 28 min
and2s
The next step in the testing process was the test case execution.
It was performed on a web based prototype implementation
and we used three different tools to get the
results:
1. The execution of the test cases was performed
by using the ACS-Automated-testing
tool (http://openacs.org/xowiki/
acs-automated-testing).
2. The tclwebtest (http://tclwebtest.
sourceforge.net/) framework to describe
the executable test cases for web applications.
3. The Wireshark (http://www.wireshark.
org/) tool was also used to capture the interaction of
the hospitals within their information systems.
After the execution of each test case we extracted from
the collected traces the contexts of the hospitals. Within
this set of contexts information we verified if the security
rule presented in the test case held. According to the equation
1 we said that the verdict after executing this test case
was positive: a) if rule held in this context and the verdict
provided by ACS-Automated-testing was positive, or b) if
the rule did not hold in this context and the verdict provided
by the ACS-Automated-testing tool was negative. As a result
of this experiment we got with a positive verdict 48 test
cases meanwhile we got with a false verdict for 5 test cases.
For instance, one of the detected problems was that the system
of an hospital did not notify to the doctors of the other
hospital when a shared report was modified.
5. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper we have presented our formal methodology
to check interoperability security policies in an informal
way. We have tried to describe our experience while testing
complex environments by using our formal approach. In
this paper we present our specification formalism. In particular,
we focus on representing the interoperability security
policies of these systems. Next, we show how we can automatically
extract a finite set of tests from the specification
and how these tests are run again the system under test in
order to get a verdict.
In addition with our testing framework, in this paper we
have shown a case study in a controlled environment where
the interoperability security rules were checked. We consider
that the use of this testing methodology is very positive
and encouraging as to support the use of formal methods.
As future work we would like to add some extra (probabilistic)
information in our tests in order to increase their
coverage in a virtual organization environment.
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