Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Argentine primary sector <strong>and</strong> ensure exports to Great Britain. In exchange, <strong>Argentina</strong> promised to<br />
reduce tariffs on British imports <strong>and</strong> made other concessions to British companies that operated in<br />
the country. Although the treaty was not fully honored by <strong>Argentina</strong>, it did spur the debate about<br />
the role of industry. For the first time, industrialists began to call for economic independence,<br />
self-sufficiency <strong>and</strong> autarky as <strong>Argentina</strong>'s answer to the new international order, <strong>and</strong> they<br />
continued to do so during the uncertain period of the Second World War.<br />
This process of import substitution intensified during the Second World War under the shelter of<br />
the trade barriers associated with the war. By the end of the war, the manufacturing sector was<br />
playing a significant role in the economy, but manufacturers were arguing that a strong policy of<br />
commercial protection <strong>and</strong> subsidies was needed in order for them to survive, especially if the<br />
terms of trade were likely to improve. It was under the leadership of General Perón, in the midst of<br />
a major political shift, that these dem<strong>and</strong>s were to be fulfilled.<br />
4.3 A New <strong>Argentina</strong><br />
The 1930s world economic crisis had profound effects on the economic <strong>and</strong> political life of<br />
<strong>Argentina</strong>. Certainly, much of the development of Argentine foreign trade seen during the 1930s,<br />
1940s <strong>and</strong> early 1950s can be seen simply as a consequence of trade agreements <strong>and</strong> exogenous<br />
shocks coming from the rest of the world. The crisis <strong>and</strong> its immediate consequences were also a<br />
shock for the political life of the country. By the same token, the economic changes that were<br />
occurring also triggered major changes in the socioeconomic structure which ultimately created<br />
conditions conducive to the development of a populist mass movement.<br />
Argentine politics was monopolized by the l<strong>and</strong>owning elite until 1916, when a major political<br />
shift occurred thanks to an electoral reform law passed in 1912 which ushered in universal adult<br />
male suffrage (though it restricted the right to vote of the large number of unnaturalized<br />
immigrants), secret ballots <strong>and</strong> compulsory voting. Despite its apparently democratic implications,<br />
this reform was designed to perpetuate the prevailing oligarchic system by extending the vote to<br />
the urban middle-class, whose members had taken part in the economic expansion in the sense that<br />
they were working in the service sector, although they had been excluded from the strongholds of<br />
power. Not surprisingly, the oligarchic elite that ruled the country believed that middle-class<br />
workers were committed to maintaining the existing political <strong>and</strong> economic structure.<br />
This experiment in limited democracy (the new electoral law gave voting rights to nearly one<br />
million adult males, but this was no more than approximately 40% of the adult male population)<br />
was interrupted in 1930, when the army carried out a coup <strong>and</strong> installed itself as the dominant<br />
factor in Argentine politics. Over time, the popular base of the democratic system exp<strong>and</strong>ed. In<br />
1946, 3.4 million adult males had voting rights (see Cantón, 1968). Thus, the voice of the people in<br />
the Argentine political system grew substantially between 1916 <strong>and</strong> 1946, despite the intervening<br />
military coup. By 1946, the economic configuration had changed dramatically. The political<br />
alignment between l<strong>and</strong>owners <strong>and</strong> workers had broken down. Instead, workers --now mainly<br />
employed in the secondary sector-- found their perfect ally in the capitalists of the manufacturing<br />
sector, because their political preferences were aligned both in the short <strong>and</strong> in the medium terms<br />
(see Section 3.2). Under Peronist policies, more capital <strong>and</strong> labor shifted to the secondary sector,<br />
thereby furthering the process of industrialization <strong>and</strong> consolidating both this alliance <strong>and</strong> the