Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
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paid Police Forces. 22 A third difference is that militarized Police Forces do not used to pay<br />
overtime for the street-level service as cops. In the lines of Tirole (1986), avoiding these<br />
discretionary payments seem useful to reduce the probability of collusion. In recent years,<br />
though, the budgetary problems have induced both members of Gendarmeria <strong>and</strong> Prefectura to<br />
sell private security services outside of their normal working time. We are yet to see the<br />
consequences of such a reform. A fifth important difference has to do with geographic<br />
personnel rotation. Police officers of the PFA that render their service on the City of Buenos<br />
Aires are hardly rotated to the interior of the country <strong>and</strong> vice versa. Agents of the Police of the<br />
Province of Buenos Aires move very little. Only Captains rotate once a year, but always on the<br />
same jurisdiction. On the contrary, the National Gendarmerie’s strategy is set to avoid<br />
collusion. Both Officers <strong>and</strong> Enrolled Gendarmes are constantly being rotated to different<br />
locations across the country, staying in general no more than three years on the same location.<br />
Within the location, every two months they either change their post or their shift so as not to let<br />
the people get involved with one particular gendarme. The Coast Guard still have some<br />
rotation, but only for the high rank personnel, which moves every two or three years.<br />
Subordinate officers hardly rotate; their post is fixed. They are only moved as a punishment for<br />
bad performance. As expected, the militarized forces are also stricter with norms of conduct.<br />
Coast guards <strong>and</strong> gendarmes are fired if they accumulate late entrances, if they are absent from<br />
their post without a proper justification or if they do not act according to their responsibilities.<br />
Regarding the agents expelled, they have an indictment <strong>and</strong> are not allowed to work in any<br />
other security force. That is not the case for fired agents of the civilian Police Forces, as there is<br />
no track of them. In the Police of the Province of Buenos Aires , there are no records of<br />
expelled personnel, despite most cops were fired due to cases of corruption. In short, the<br />
punishment from misbehavior in the civilian Police Forces seems weaker <strong>and</strong> less credible than<br />
in the militarized forces. Regarding the bribe offers, one should recognize that not all forces<br />
can issue tickets, which might be an important determinant of the willingness of civilians to<br />
bribe. Both the PFA <strong>and</strong> the Provincial Police, as they act as local police forces in their<br />
respective jurisdiction, are allowed to fine civilians. The Argentinean Coast Guard acts as the<br />
local Police Force in the City’s district of Puerto Madero (as well as other port jurisdictions all<br />
over the country), 23 where they also have the authority to fine civilians. In contrast the<br />
National Gendarmerie is the only force that it is not allowed to issue tickets, even though it is<br />
responsible for the security of the national roads. Although we cannot fully discard that this is<br />
behind the differences in perception among Police Forces in <strong>Argentina</strong>, we think it is not the<br />
main issue. On the one h<strong>and</strong> there can also be some bribing in national roads, by Gendarmes,<br />
because issuing a ticket is not the only bargaining tool to get money. <strong>Di</strong>scretionary delays <strong>and</strong><br />
other special requirements have to be taken into account too. On the other h<strong>and</strong> the anecdotal<br />
explanations for why the civilian Police Forces have worse reputation is not because of petty<br />
bribes, but because of deeper problems, like close connection with local Mafias, criminals or<br />
illegal businesses. In short, even if the comparison cannot be perfect, the diversify of Police<br />
Organization <strong>and</strong> performance within <strong>Argentina</strong> is suggestive of a lesson: the Argentinean<br />
security organizations that follow similar practices than Carabienros de Chile are better<br />
evaluated by Argentinean citizens.<br />
22 Although in the last few years Gendarmeria started to enroll personnel in the Capital city<br />
23 In Puerto Madero there is a high density of policeman from Prefectura. There are 500 subordinate officers <strong>and</strong> 40<br />
superior officers, who work in 4 quarters of 8 rotary hours.