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Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

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is not a perfect fit, there seems to be a clear negative correlation between the<br />

evolution of GDP <strong>and</strong> inequality indicators during the episodes of crisis <strong>and</strong> recovery.<br />

This is clearly visible during the crises of episodes 3 <strong>and</strong> 5, <strong>and</strong> the recovery of<br />

episode 6.<br />

Underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>and</strong> accounting for crises is relevant, first <strong>and</strong> foremost, because of<br />

their large negative effect on household welfare, which has been documented<br />

elsewhere. 19 In terms of their effect on inequality, the following paragraphs<br />

concentrate on the mechanisms determining the differential impact of crises along the<br />

income distribution, <strong>and</strong> on the channels through which they can have a permanent<br />

effect on its shape.<br />

From the macroeconomy-distribution perspective, the two largest crises (1989-1991<br />

<strong>and</strong> 2001-2002) represent the most interesting episodes over the period, since they<br />

present unusually large falls in GDP <strong>and</strong> simultaneously large distributional<br />

impacts. 20 Under these two large crises, the evolution of poverty <strong>and</strong> inequality were<br />

dominated by the combination of falling output <strong>and</strong> sudden increases in prices,<br />

although the inflationary processes were fundamentally different in nature during both<br />

crises. 21<br />

Given the fiscal origin of most high inflation <strong>and</strong> hyperinflation bouts (Heymann <strong>and</strong><br />

Leijonhufvud, 1995), it is not surprising that the literature concentrates on the<br />

differential incidence of the inflation tax. 22 Ahumada et al. (1993, 2000) have<br />

quantified the distributional effects of inflation in <strong>Argentina</strong> from a tax-incidence<br />

perspective. Recurring to similar methodologies, both studies estimate monetary<br />

dem<strong>and</strong> functions, aggregate inflation tax <strong>and</strong> seigniorage collection, <strong>and</strong> a re-weight<br />

the consumer price index by quintile of the income distribution based on the 1987<br />

19 See for instance the discussion for Latin America <strong>and</strong> the Caribbean in Lustig (2000), <strong>and</strong> the<br />

comparative discussion of the impact of financial crises in the region <strong>and</strong> South-East Asia in Fallon <strong>and</strong><br />

Lucas (2002).<br />

20 The recession preceding the Austral stabilization plan in 1985 was not associated to large increases in<br />

inequality. Also, as stated above, the lasting effects of the Tequila crises cannot be disentangled from<br />

those of the host of reforms taking place simultaneously.<br />

21 The devaluation in early 2002 implied a jump in the price level to accommodate the new relative<br />

prices of the economy. The inflation in the 2003-2007 period, although increasing, was moderate when<br />

compared to the hyperinflations of 1989 <strong>and</strong> 1991. It was mostly due to the expansive monetary policy,<br />

the growing levels of employment <strong>and</strong> to the adjustment of the real exchange rate to its equilibrium<br />

level after the devaluation’s overshooting in a context of a dirty floating exchange rate regime.<br />

Contrary to the experience of the 1980s, government financing through the inflationary tax did not<br />

seem to be a major force behind the changes in the price index.<br />

22 Inflation constitutes by definition a proportional tax on nominal balances, but its effect on the income<br />

distribution is neutral only if all households face the same inflation rate, if all households have the<br />

same income elasticity in their dem<strong>and</strong> for money, or if they all have access to the same “inflationprotection”<br />

technologies. Theoretical models have been developed by Bulir (1998) <strong>and</strong> Sturzenegger<br />

(1997), among others.

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