Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

in Argentina is hard from a fiscal and constitutional points of view, at least much complicated
than in Chile, which is organized as a unitary republic. 32 This difficulties become stronger
when the overall fiscal position of the country is weak, as in Argentina between 1980 and 2003.
While for a teacher or a nurse in a public hospital is much harder to ask for bribes, for a
policeman the reduction in wages can be compensated by an increase in illegal sources of
compensation, generating a probably higher social cost. The problem is permanent, even if the
cause is transitory, because when receiving bribes loses social stigma, then there is no reason to
stop the corruption even after wages come back to normal. In contrast, Chile had a better fiscal
position in the last 30 years. But even in cases of fiscal problems, like the 1982 debt crisis, the
bargaining on how to distribute a fiscal shock favored more the Police, especially because
Carabineros was an important member of the military junta running the country at the time.
This strong position of the Police in the budgetary decisions shielded even more the personnel
benefits and the organizational culture to macroeconomic shocks. To finish, there is now a
movement towards reform, because as of 2007-2008 the Argentinean government is increasing
the personnel of Police Forces that are better evaluated in surveys (Gendarmeria Nacional and
Prefectura Naval). This might be due to the improved fiscal position as well as the political
weight that crime has been receiving recently. Nonetheless, we watch this recent move towards
expanding national Police Forces with caution. For example, because the new enrollment of
Gendarmeria and Prefectura are being made with “fast” six month training, to fit the
spreadsheet of governmental targets of more Police Forces. Promising more quantity of the
Police Forces that are better evaluated by society is not a bad move in itself. However, myopia
seems pervasive. Having a short training is against the normal practices of Gendarmeria and
more like the practice of the poorly evaluated Police of the Province of Buenos Aires. In our
view, this is the tip of the iceberg of a deeper problem, in which politics wants to deliver
political promises without internalizing the long term costs that this can have in the reputation
of public organizations. 33 Building strong institutions requires long term political players,
which seem lacking in Argentina according to Spiller and Tommasi (2003)
7. Concluding remarks.
In Argentina Police Forces are among the least trusted organizations. Despite being better than
in Chile a century ago, the Argentinean Police Forces have decayed during the 20th century. In
contrast, nowadays the Chilean Police is among the most respected organizations in the
country. The difference is there, despite Argentina having roughly twice the number of
policeman per capita than Chile, with wages that are not that different. We document that
various organizational practices may account for the current difference between Chilean
Carabineros and the Argentinan Police. One difference is that the Chilean police is more
educated and trained longer. A second difference is that the Chilean police is national and the
personnel rotates geographically. This is a well known device used to prevent collusion within
the organization or with the local political elite. While there are other differences between
countries, it is reassuring to know that the Argentinean Police Organization that resembles the
most to the Chilean Carabineros, namely Gendarmeria Nacional, is evaluated better than other
Police Forces in Argentina. This comparative exercise suggests that the same set of
organizational incentives may be useful on both sides of the Andes. In this chapter, we asked
32 For example, the Federal government could not reduce the provincial budget to use the resources in a nationally
funded police.
33 Even in Chile in the early 1990s the government requested a target for more Carabineros by using express
training. Fortunately many internal controls were in place, and a large proportion of this “express Carabineros”
ended out of the organization soon. Poor training seem to be a problem even for good police forces in countries
with better institutions