Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
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A final point on this mechanistic approach to growth: with a fixed amount of natural resources in<br />
the production function, it could appear that population growth would dilute "l<strong>and</strong>" more rapidly<br />
than capital, leading to a lower rate of economic growth. That is not necessarily the case. If<br />
suddenly both <strong>Argentina</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s double their population, per capita GDP would fall<br />
by half in both cases if there are constant returns to scale, no matter what the factorial<br />
combination behind that income. Both could compensate for that increase in population by<br />
increasing capital − actually, as pointed before, <strong>Argentina</strong> could have an advantage here as it<br />
would need less investment to attain the original per capita income, as capital would be more<br />
productive there if there are decreasing returns. Higher population growth reduces economic<br />
growth with or without natural resources in the production function 7 .<br />
The message here is that there aren't obvious reasons in mainstream growth theory telling us that<br />
<strong>Argentina</strong> should have diverged from the rich as soon as incorporation of new l<strong>and</strong> −a key to its<br />
earlier success− came to an end. The motives behind <strong>Argentina</strong>'s decline need to be more subtle<br />
in trying to explain the dynamics of factor <strong>and</strong> technology accumulation. That doesn't exclude, of<br />
course, models in which natural resources can be a curse, in any of the many ways surveyed, for<br />
example, by Sachs <strong>and</strong> Warner (1997). Two- <strong>and</strong> three-sector models have been central to the<br />
debate on <strong>Argentina</strong>'s growth difficulties 8 . Most of them touch upon the question of whether<br />
<strong>Argentina</strong> could have grown by persisting in its bet on its natural resources or if, rather, capital<br />
accumulation <strong>and</strong> technological advances necessarily required a structural transformation<br />
towards a more diversified economy − <strong>and</strong> the related question of whether that transformation<br />
would result from a market process or could only take place with government's assistance.<br />
Models in the endogenous growth tradition do probably make a difference between <strong>Argentina</strong><br />
<strong>and</strong> Netherl<strong>and</strong>s under the conditions described above. For example: Campante <strong>and</strong> <strong>Glaeser</strong>'s<br />
paper in this volume show that Buenos Aires had lower levels of physical <strong>and</strong> human capital than<br />
Chicago. In models such as Lucas (1988), the level of human capital is a significant determinant<br />
of economic growth, as the rate of increase in human capital depends on its level, through<br />
externalities. A similar story could be made of technology or physical capital. Would <strong>Argentina</strong><br />
fit in such a model or would it still be an outlier? Can a model along such lines explain the<br />
unstable timing of <strong>Argentina</strong>'s decline, with periods of accelerated divergence (the 1980s) <strong>and</strong><br />
some of moderate convergence (the 1960s)? The answer is far from obvious.<br />
The general point here is that even if arguments relating <strong>Argentina</strong>'s subsequent development to<br />
its conditions at some point in its prosperous may be true, in any case there's nothing evident<br />
about them. In other words: <strong>Argentina</strong>'s twentieth century economic performance is in fact a<br />
puzzle. There are no straightforward reasons why, contemplating <strong>Argentina</strong> in 1910 or 1928, one<br />
could predict <strong>Argentina</strong>'s unfortunate divergence. It should come as no surprise that<br />
contemporary observers tended to be optimistic about <strong>Argentina</strong>'s future, in 1900, the twenties or<br />
even as late as the immediate postwar. 9 An almost-rich country turned almost-poor, <strong>Argentina</strong> is<br />
7 And it's probably a factor of some significance to underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>Argentina</strong>'s comparative decline. In 1910,<br />
<strong>Argentina</strong>'s population was 2.4% of the population of the "richest twelve" (footnote 2); in 2000, it was 6.4%.<br />
8 The list of explanations in this vein are too numerous to be listed here. <strong>Di</strong> <strong>Tella</strong> <strong>and</strong> Zymmelman (1967) <strong>and</strong> Díaz<br />
Alej<strong>and</strong>ro (1970) are two examples.<br />
9 One of them was Paul Samuelson: "In 1945 I was a young talented economist. I was at the height of my abilities. If<br />
someone had asked me what part of the earth would develop the fastest in the next 39 years, I would have said: Latin