19.04.2014 Views

Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

A final point on this mechanistic approach to growth: with a fixed amount of natural resources in<br />

the production function, it could appear that population growth would dilute "l<strong>and</strong>" more rapidly<br />

than capital, leading to a lower rate of economic growth. That is not necessarily the case. If<br />

suddenly both <strong>Argentina</strong> <strong>and</strong> the Netherl<strong>and</strong>s double their population, per capita GDP would fall<br />

by half in both cases if there are constant returns to scale, no matter what the factorial<br />

combination behind that income. Both could compensate for that increase in population by<br />

increasing capital − actually, as pointed before, <strong>Argentina</strong> could have an advantage here as it<br />

would need less investment to attain the original per capita income, as capital would be more<br />

productive there if there are decreasing returns. Higher population growth reduces economic<br />

growth with or without natural resources in the production function 7 .<br />

The message here is that there aren't obvious reasons in mainstream growth theory telling us that<br />

<strong>Argentina</strong> should have diverged from the rich as soon as incorporation of new l<strong>and</strong> −a key to its<br />

earlier success− came to an end. The motives behind <strong>Argentina</strong>'s decline need to be more subtle<br />

in trying to explain the dynamics of factor <strong>and</strong> technology accumulation. That doesn't exclude, of<br />

course, models in which natural resources can be a curse, in any of the many ways surveyed, for<br />

example, by Sachs <strong>and</strong> Warner (1997). Two- <strong>and</strong> three-sector models have been central to the<br />

debate on <strong>Argentina</strong>'s growth difficulties 8 . Most of them touch upon the question of whether<br />

<strong>Argentina</strong> could have grown by persisting in its bet on its natural resources or if, rather, capital<br />

accumulation <strong>and</strong> technological advances necessarily required a structural transformation<br />

towards a more diversified economy − <strong>and</strong> the related question of whether that transformation<br />

would result from a market process or could only take place with government's assistance.<br />

Models in the endogenous growth tradition do probably make a difference between <strong>Argentina</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> Netherl<strong>and</strong>s under the conditions described above. For example: Campante <strong>and</strong> <strong>Glaeser</strong>'s<br />

paper in this volume show that Buenos Aires had lower levels of physical <strong>and</strong> human capital than<br />

Chicago. In models such as Lucas (1988), the level of human capital is a significant determinant<br />

of economic growth, as the rate of increase in human capital depends on its level, through<br />

externalities. A similar story could be made of technology or physical capital. Would <strong>Argentina</strong><br />

fit in such a model or would it still be an outlier? Can a model along such lines explain the<br />

unstable timing of <strong>Argentina</strong>'s decline, with periods of accelerated divergence (the 1980s) <strong>and</strong><br />

some of moderate convergence (the 1960s)? The answer is far from obvious.<br />

The general point here is that even if arguments relating <strong>Argentina</strong>'s subsequent development to<br />

its conditions at some point in its prosperous may be true, in any case there's nothing evident<br />

about them. In other words: <strong>Argentina</strong>'s twentieth century economic performance is in fact a<br />

puzzle. There are no straightforward reasons why, contemplating <strong>Argentina</strong> in 1910 or 1928, one<br />

could predict <strong>Argentina</strong>'s unfortunate divergence. It should come as no surprise that<br />

contemporary observers tended to be optimistic about <strong>Argentina</strong>'s future, in 1900, the twenties or<br />

even as late as the immediate postwar. 9 An almost-rich country turned almost-poor, <strong>Argentina</strong> is<br />

7 And it's probably a factor of some significance to underst<strong>and</strong>ing <strong>Argentina</strong>'s comparative decline. In 1910,<br />

<strong>Argentina</strong>'s population was 2.4% of the population of the "richest twelve" (footnote 2); in 2000, it was 6.4%.<br />

8 The list of explanations in this vein are too numerous to be listed here. <strong>Di</strong> <strong>Tella</strong> <strong>and</strong> Zymmelman (1967) <strong>and</strong> Díaz<br />

Alej<strong>and</strong>ro (1970) are two examples.<br />

9 One of them was Paul Samuelson: "In 1945 I was a young talented economist. I was at the height of my abilities. If<br />

someone had asked me what part of the earth would develop the fastest in the next 39 years, I would have said: Latin

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!