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Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty

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Figure 14. Selected capital per capita<br />

1400<br />

1200<br />

1000<br />

800<br />

Agricultural machinery per<br />

agro worker 1876=100<br />

Machinery in<br />

manufacturing per<br />

manuf. worker,<br />

1876=100<br />

600<br />

400<br />

Km of railways per agro<br />

worker 1876=100<br />

200<br />

0<br />

1876<br />

1879<br />

1882<br />

1885<br />

1888<br />

1891<br />

1894<br />

1897<br />

1900<br />

1903<br />

1906<br />

1909<br />

1912<br />

1915<br />

1918<br />

1921<br />

1924<br />

1927<br />

1930<br />

Sources: Same as Figure 13. Machinery in manufacturing from CEPAL (1959).<br />

The Argentine export sector was rapidly becoming more capital intensive in the 1920s.<br />

Capital per worker was actually growing more in agriculture <strong>and</strong> ranching than in<br />

manufacturing, which suffered heavily from World War I shortage of capital goods imports.<br />

Even so, the manufacturing sector was getting larger in absolute terms (Figure 15). In other<br />

words: <strong>Argentina</strong> was becoming more capital intensive both through factor substitution within<br />

sectors <strong>and</strong> through structural change favoring the more capital intensive manufacturing<br />

sector. This style of growth was clearly different from the one predating WWI, as can be seen<br />

by comparing the capital invested in railways with machinery in both <strong>Argentina</strong>'s farms <strong>and</strong><br />

its factories. In 1913, the value of capital invested in railways was 50% higher than the<br />

combined value of machinery in <strong>Argentina</strong>'s primary <strong>and</strong> secondary sectors. By the end of the<br />

1920s, these were 60% higher than capital in railways 19 . Can the 1920s be described as a time<br />

of retardation in capital accumulation? The answer depends on the status conferred to one<br />

type of capital (railways) which is an inevitable complement of l<strong>and</strong> accumulation, at least for<br />

products with a high weight-value ratio. In such a context there cannot be a "l<strong>and</strong> intensive"<br />

type of growth that is not at the same time "railway intensive". But capital-intensification not<br />

related to l<strong>and</strong> accumulation was actually faster in the 1920s, through capital intensification in<br />

agriculture <strong>and</strong> a widening of the manufacturing sector, which absorbed both capital <strong>and</strong><br />

labor.<br />

Why was the economy becoming more capital intensive during the 1920s? Three possible <strong>and</strong><br />

non-exclusive hypotheses come to mind. First, it could just be the Solowian mechanics of<br />

accumulation at work. The fact that Argentine savings were actually being employed at home<br />

rather than abroad would imply that in spite of the exhaustion of opportunities for railway<br />

extension, <strong>Argentina</strong> was still perceived as a suitable place for investment. A combination of<br />

size <strong>and</strong> average income of its internal market certainly boosted manufacturing production,<br />

19 CEPAL (1959).

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