Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Exceptional Argentina Di Tella, Glaeser and Llach - Thomas Piketty
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
Buenos Aires shows that – from 1910 to 2003 – average yearly mortality has increase by two<br />
policemen every decade. Nothing disproportionate considering the growth in both the city<br />
population <strong>and</strong> the Police Force. 18 Other environmental component that may have an impact<br />
on the Police is the judicial process <strong>and</strong> the penalties. As a proxy for it, one can see that<br />
incarceration rate is twice as big in Chile than in <strong>Argentina</strong>; 235 versus 114 incarcerated people<br />
per 100,000 inhabitants. Note, however, that this is still a third or a quarter of what it is in the<br />
United States, with 700 incarcerated per 100,000 people UNODC (2002) 19 . With the available<br />
evidence it’s hard to discard that interaction with the judiciary is not binding for the quality of<br />
the Police. Other three “environmental factors” may also underlie a lower supply of bribes in<br />
Chile vis-à-vis <strong>Argentina</strong>. First, faults <strong>and</strong> crimes against a policeman are judged by a military<br />
court in Chile, whereas in <strong>Argentina</strong>, on top of the low social stigma from bribing <strong>and</strong> the low<br />
monitoring, bribers are judged by civilian courts, which usually means a lower expected<br />
punishment. Second, different anecdotes of the Police suggest that the prohibition of illegal<br />
games <strong>and</strong> prostitution was more active in <strong>Argentina</strong> than in Chile. This may have created<br />
higher quasi-rents for colluding with the Police <strong>and</strong> induced the proliferation of Mafias. 20<br />
Third, during the 20th century <strong>Argentina</strong> had more Mafias than Chile. Even though highly<br />
organized crime can completely distort incentives <strong>and</strong> induce malfeasance 21 , the difference in<br />
Organized crime today seems too small to be the cause of the difference in perceptions about<br />
police performance in these two countries Finally, it is important to remark that “cultural<br />
differences” between the two countries cannot fully account for the differential performance of<br />
Police Forces. As we will see in the next section, there are some isl<strong>and</strong>s of low corruption in<br />
<strong>Argentina</strong>. This seems inconsistent with an across the board Chile-<strong>Argentina</strong> cultural<br />
difference as an explanation. Interestingly, incentive systems similar to the one of Carabineros<br />
de Chile seem to produce comparable results in <strong>Argentina</strong>.<br />
5. Argentinean Police forces organized similar to the Chilean<br />
Carabineros are also better evaluated.<br />
Unlike Chile, <strong>Argentina</strong>, has many types of street level Police Forces. The majority of<br />
policemen correspond to the Provincial forces, which account for more tha 170,000 officers,<br />
including the personnel of the PFA, which has street level duties in the City of Buenos Aires .<br />
However, there are also two national organizations of security forces, Gendarmeria Nacional<br />
<strong>and</strong> Prefectura Naval, which jointly account for some 36,000 active members. These more<br />
militarized forces have a very different organizational structure. Interestingly, these two forces<br />
also receive a better evaluation from citizens in <strong>Argentina</strong>. Figure 8 shows that the civilian<br />
Police Forces (PFA <strong>and</strong> Police of the Province of Buenos Aires) have roughly twice the<br />
negative perception than the militarized ones. Although this survey was made in 2001, two<br />
years before militarized forces started to have a broader role as cops, we think that the trend is<br />
still valid today. First, because it is consistent with qualitative interviews we recently held in<br />
<strong>Argentina</strong>. Second, because in recent events of salient crimes, neighbors appeared on TV<br />
asking for more protection from Gendarmes. Finally, in Figure 98 we observe that the<br />
advantage is also present for residents of the City of Buenos Aires, where militarized forces<br />
had activity before 2001.<br />
18 See appendix<br />
19 Eight UNOCD Survey. Available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/eighthsurvey/8sv.pdf<br />
20 See Andersen, 2002 for references<br />
21 Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael <strong>Di</strong> <strong>Tella</strong>, metricconverterProductID2002. "2002. "’Plata o Plomo’:<br />
Bribe <strong>and</strong> Punishment in a Theory of Political Influence," Working Papers 2002-28, Brown University,<br />
Department of Economics.