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Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...

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<strong>The</strong> Quest For a Core<br />

<strong>The</strong> most common model for "legal science" is the idea <strong>of</strong> systematic,<br />

objective, neutral exposition <strong>of</strong> the law as it is. Establishing<br />

a theoretical foundation for "legal dogmatics", as it is called in the<br />

civilian tradition, is one <strong>of</strong> the moving forces behind legal positivism.<br />

But here we need to tread carefully. Our greatest positivist,<br />

Jeremy Bentham, insisted on a sharp distinction between Expository<br />

Jurisprudence, concerned with the systematic description <strong>of</strong> the<br />

law as it is, and Censorial Jurisprudence, concerned with the criticism<br />

and construction <strong>of</strong> law as it ought to be on the basis <strong>of</strong> utility.<br />

Bentham saw exposition as particular to a given system and a rather<br />

lowly pursuit; legislation was the noble and universal science: "<strong>The</strong><br />

Expositor, therefore, is always the citizen <strong>of</strong> this or that particular<br />

country: the Censor is, or ought to be the citizen <strong>of</strong> the world." 7<br />

Bentham, the radical positivist, distinguished the is and the ought<br />

mainly for the sake <strong>of</strong> the ought; his only contribution to legal education<br />

was to advocate a <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> Legislation.<br />

It is incorrect, therefore, to see <strong>English</strong> legal positivism as essentially<br />

conservative and uncritical. However, the positivist distinction<br />

between law as it is and law as it ought to be was later used<br />

both to ground a neutral expository, descriptive science <strong>of</strong> law as<br />

the dominant form <strong>of</strong> legal study and, sometimes, to confine legal<br />

studies to exposition. It is a short step from insisting on a sharp<br />

distinction between description and prescription to maintaining<br />

that one should describe before one ventures to criticise. 8 It is only<br />

a slightly longer step to move on to say that legal scholars, and<br />

especially law students, should only be concerned with description.<br />

It is not for fledgling practitioners to reason why or to criticise<br />

their elders. 9<br />

<strong>The</strong> tradition <strong>of</strong> teaching and scholarship that purports to confine<br />

itself to the exposition and analysis <strong>of</strong> posited law has been the<br />

subject <strong>of</strong> diverse attacks, on such grounds as that it is narrow,<br />

reactionary and dull. 10 <strong>The</strong>re is, however, a more fundamental<br />

reason for rejecting it: it is just wrong. Two <strong>of</strong> the greatest positivists—Holmes<br />

and Kelsen—can be used to make the point.<br />

In his classic address to law students "<strong>The</strong> Path <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Law</strong>", 11<br />

Holmes advised them to wash the law in cynical acid and to adopt<br />

the standpoint <strong>of</strong> a bad man, an amoral actor whose only concern<br />

is to predict the likely legal consequences <strong>of</strong> any action he takes:<br />

"If I do this, what will happen to me?"<br />

Holmes had two specific targets in mind: the tendency <strong>of</strong> students<br />

to substitute their own prejudices or values or wishes for<br />

mastery <strong>of</strong> technical detail; and an over-logical and abstracted view<br />

155

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