Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...
Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...
Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...
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<strong>The</strong> Quest For a Core<br />
<strong>The</strong> most common model for "legal science" is the idea <strong>of</strong> systematic,<br />
objective, neutral exposition <strong>of</strong> the law as it is. Establishing<br />
a theoretical foundation for "legal dogmatics", as it is called in the<br />
civilian tradition, is one <strong>of</strong> the moving forces behind legal positivism.<br />
But here we need to tread carefully. Our greatest positivist,<br />
Jeremy Bentham, insisted on a sharp distinction between Expository<br />
Jurisprudence, concerned with the systematic description <strong>of</strong> the<br />
law as it is, and Censorial Jurisprudence, concerned with the criticism<br />
and construction <strong>of</strong> law as it ought to be on the basis <strong>of</strong> utility.<br />
Bentham saw exposition as particular to a given system and a rather<br />
lowly pursuit; legislation was the noble and universal science: "<strong>The</strong><br />
Expositor, therefore, is always the citizen <strong>of</strong> this or that particular<br />
country: the Censor is, or ought to be the citizen <strong>of</strong> the world." 7<br />
Bentham, the radical positivist, distinguished the is and the ought<br />
mainly for the sake <strong>of</strong> the ought; his only contribution to legal education<br />
was to advocate a <strong>School</strong> <strong>of</strong> Legislation.<br />
It is incorrect, therefore, to see <strong>English</strong> legal positivism as essentially<br />
conservative and uncritical. However, the positivist distinction<br />
between law as it is and law as it ought to be was later used<br />
both to ground a neutral expository, descriptive science <strong>of</strong> law as<br />
the dominant form <strong>of</strong> legal study and, sometimes, to confine legal<br />
studies to exposition. It is a short step from insisting on a sharp<br />
distinction between description and prescription to maintaining<br />
that one should describe before one ventures to criticise. 8 It is only<br />
a slightly longer step to move on to say that legal scholars, and<br />
especially law students, should only be concerned with description.<br />
It is not for fledgling practitioners to reason why or to criticise<br />
their elders. 9<br />
<strong>The</strong> tradition <strong>of</strong> teaching and scholarship that purports to confine<br />
itself to the exposition and analysis <strong>of</strong> posited law has been the<br />
subject <strong>of</strong> diverse attacks, on such grounds as that it is narrow,<br />
reactionary and dull. 10 <strong>The</strong>re is, however, a more fundamental<br />
reason for rejecting it: it is just wrong. Two <strong>of</strong> the greatest positivists—Holmes<br />
and Kelsen—can be used to make the point.<br />
In his classic address to law students "<strong>The</strong> Path <strong>of</strong> the <strong>Law</strong>", 11<br />
Holmes advised them to wash the law in cynical acid and to adopt<br />
the standpoint <strong>of</strong> a bad man, an amoral actor whose only concern<br />
is to predict the likely legal consequences <strong>of</strong> any action he takes:<br />
"If I do this, what will happen to me?"<br />
Holmes had two specific targets in mind: the tendency <strong>of</strong> students<br />
to substitute their own prejudices or values or wishes for<br />
mastery <strong>of</strong> technical detail; and an over-logical and abstracted view<br />
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