Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...

The Quest For a Core
interpretation there is little that is unique or special about "the legal
mind" except the ability to apply some general intellectual skills
in some specific kinds of context.
I have suggested that if there is anything that is unique or special
that academic lawyers have to offer at a general level to colleagues
from other disciplines it is local knowledge of an important area.
Let me conclude by illustrating this by one last case-study taken
from one of my fields of special interest, evidence.
In an important recent book on The Evidential Foundations of
Probabilistic Reasoning David Schum, a psychologist, has
attempted to synthesise basic ideas and insights about evidence
and inference from, among others, law, philosophy, logic, history,
probability theory, semiotics, artificial intelligence and psychology.
96 Evidence and inference are of concern to any discipline and
practical activity in which conclusions and decisions are reached
on the basis of incomplete information. 97 In practical affairs
accountants, actuaries, air traffic controllers, detectives, doctors,
engineers, insurers, intelligence analysts, meteorologists, and
sailors are among those who have to make decisions on the basis
of inferences from evidence. Problems of evidence, proof and probability
have accordingly been much debated in a variety of disciplines.
In popular culture problems of inference are at the core of
detective stories and other mysteries. Sherlock Holmes regularly
features in the literature of several disciplines. 98
Schum states that legal scholarship on evidence "forms the major
source of inspiration for anyone interested in a general study of the
general properties and uses of evidence". 99 Schum commends the
study of evidence in law to other disciplines especially in respect
of dealing with complex bodies of evidence and reconstructing
unique particular events, and in relation to some particular aspects
of inference, such as cascaded inferences (inference upon
inference), ways of testing the authenticity and credibility of evidentiary
sources, ancillary evidence and second-hand or indirect
evidence, such as hearsay. The general theme of his analysis is that
the complexity of inferential tasks has often been underestimated
in some disciplines or treated with resignation in others, whereas
in law we have been forced as a practical matter routinely to
grapple with at least some of these difficulties. A rich body of scholarship,
claims Schum, has grown up around these practical activities;
much of it is of direct relevance to scholars and practitioners
in other disciplines and activities concerned with evidence and
inference, but it has to date only been exploited spasmodically.
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