Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...
Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...
Blackstone's Tower: The English Law School - College of Social ...
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<strong>Law</strong> in Culture and Society<br />
cesses and institutions. And who would exclude the history,<br />
philosophy or anthropology <strong>of</strong> law as being <strong>of</strong> no concern to legal<br />
scholars?<br />
Thirdly, in respect <strong>of</strong> any <strong>of</strong> these different conceptions there<br />
will be many borderline cases, yet the problem <strong>of</strong> whether or not<br />
some particular example is to be treated as falling inside or outside<br />
a precisely drawn boundary is <strong>of</strong>ten quite trivial. Precise boundarydrawing<br />
by courts sometimes has important practical consequences,<br />
but in many other contexts whether a borderline case<br />
is classified as "legal" or "non-legal" is not important. It does not<br />
matter for the purposes <strong>of</strong> the newspaper exercise whether one<br />
treats a report <strong>of</strong> a routine police investigation <strong>of</strong> a murder or a<br />
hostile take-over bid as being "legally relevant" or not.<br />
I propose to adopt a broad conception <strong>of</strong> the subject-matter <strong>of</strong><br />
the discipline <strong>of</strong> law without entering into complex issues <strong>of</strong> legal<br />
theory to justify this position. In due course we shall come across<br />
alternative, generally narrower, conceptions <strong>of</strong> the subject and we<br />
can consider some <strong>of</strong> the pros and cons <strong>of</strong> such alternative perspectives.<br />
Nor will I concern myself very much with outer boundaries<br />
<strong>of</strong> my discipline and with borderline cases. Rather, following<br />
the American jurist Karl Llewellyn, I shall adopt the broad and<br />
deliberately vague conception <strong>of</strong> law as a social institution specialised<br />
to the performing <strong>of</strong> certain tasks or meeting certain needs<br />
in human groups, especially those groups which we call societies. 20<br />
<strong>The</strong>se tasks include dispute-prevention, dispute-settlement, allocation<br />
<strong>of</strong> power and authority, and the technology involved in performing<br />
these tasks, including the skills, devices and artefacts that<br />
have been produced by the systematic study <strong>of</strong> law. 21 In this view<br />
the subject-matter <strong>of</strong> the study <strong>of</strong> law includes ideas, principles,<br />
rules, personnel, processes, institutions, skills, and much else<br />
besides. Later we can consider whether and when we can sensibly<br />
place any limits on the field and whether it can be said to have a<br />
core. 22 This broad conception, to which I am generally sympathetic,<br />
fits my present purpose because I am here concerned with<br />
what is in fact studied in law schools—and all <strong>of</strong> these matters are<br />
in fact studied in at least some law schools.<br />
I shall not try here to justify my choice <strong>of</strong> perspective theoretically.<br />
But it may be useful to illustrate its application by reference<br />
to a research project in which I was recently engaged. As part <strong>of</strong><br />
a wider project on archives policy in the Commonwealth, a team<br />
<strong>of</strong> us undertook a case-study <strong>of</strong> legal records in Accra, Ghana. 23<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the main objectives <strong>of</strong> the project was to persuade archivists<br />
18