WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE 1917

24 WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE
which this was advocated, but confessed that he had been
driven out of his position by the criticisms contained in an
examination of that memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe.
Crowe's powerfully written document took a pessimistic
view of the prospects of post-War disarmament. It is summarised
in Appendix C, and is worth reading as an accurate
account of difficulties actually experienced.
In this discussion which ensued it was pointed out that
one of the first difficulties in the way was that of the standard
of armaments to be allowed for each nation. The existence
of our own dominating sea power, coupled with the sea
power of America, was undoubtedly the best guarantee for
peace; but it was probably one of the very first things which
the members of an international body would agree should be
cut down.
Then, again, there was the difficulty of the manner in
which any limitation could be prescribed. Napoleon's attempt
to limit the Prussian Army to a definite numerical
strength had been directly responsible for the creation of the
Prussian military system.
Further, it was impossible to draw the line as to what
constituted armaments. In the present War, Germany had
been able for two years and more to hold her own against
the rest of the world in armaments, owing to her effective
industrial organisation. That organisation had not been
purely planned for war; its adaptation to military purposes
had been a matter of improvisation in Germany as well as
in Allied countries. But the fact remained that it was an
essential part of Germany's military strength.
Lastly, there was the difficulty that the Powers who
were most likely to use their armaments in order to forward
their ambitions were the ones who would be least willing to
fall in whole-heartedly and honestly with any scheme of
limitation of armaments that might be agreed upon.